




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LECTURES

ON

THE APOCALYPTICS

BY

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PREL. OF

AND THE UNIVERSITY

&

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Lecture 1st

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All things in nature are either material or immaterial. Matter & mind compose the universe. Natural Philosophy and Chemistry belong to the material, and Grammar, rhetoric, logic, the fine arts and metaphysics belong to the immaterial. With those that have matter for their object we have nothing to do. Among the others we find metaphysics, which is the subject we are now about to treat of.

Grammar treats of the thoughts of the mind in the relation of words to each other.

Rhetoric regards the mind with respect to persuasion. Logic regards the mind with respect to that operation which we call reason.

The fine arts contemplate those delicate sensibilities & perceptions of the mind.

Natural theology contemplates the Divine Being. Metaphysics regards the mind in none of these particulars, ^{exclusively} but treats of its laws & operations in general.

Metaphysics was in former times divided into two grand branches, ontology and pneumatology, the last of ^{which} was again divided into psychology which treats of the human soul, and natural theology. But as this is treated of as a separate science, psychology may cover the same ground as metaphysics. The subject of metaphysics has been spoken of with contempt, & the term has been applied to things absurd; but when a person ridicules it, he pronounces a satire on his own mind. It is a very important subject. It makes a person acquainted with his own mind, and suggests the best ways of improving it. It teaches us to call off

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our minds from the pursuit of those sens-

ual images that obstruct the progress of thought & useful inquiry. It calls into exercise the noblest powers of the mind, as judgment, reflection abstraction ^{analysis} &c. and may even become subservient to the powers of piety. These are sufficient to make young men desire to study it, who wish to derive the honors which ^{the} intellectual always receive.

How to understand met. After the importance of the subject has been shown, the next thing is, how are we to get a knowledge of it? We must first understand the meaning of the terms, & the principal way to understand these is by definitions. But here a difficulty arises, namely, that all words are not capable of being defined.

Logical Definition A logical definition must contain the nearest genus & the specific difference.

As this is an important matter we will give it a farther explanation. When we look around us we ^{see} a number of various objects. We then, in the first place classify them. All that resemble each other we place together, and call them a genus. We only regard the things in which they agree, & leave out of consideration those wherein they differ. E. G. We see different kinds of trees all of which agree in certain respects, which entitle them to the name 'genus'. But we see the oak, the walnut, the sugar, the beech &c. all of which differ from each other in certain other respects. Each of these forms a lower class called a species. Again we see men, horses, cattle sheep, hogs &c, all of which have certain properties in common. We therefore comprize them all under the general term, animal.

But each of these is different from all

the others, therefore each kind form a separate class, called a species.

sp. dif. A species is the lowest class which contains individuals only. The specific difference is the difference between one genus and all others. Since then a logical definition must contain the nearest genus and the specific difference, it follows that all terms will not admit of a definition.

Cases in which definition can't be given. The following are the cases in which a definition cannot be given. 1st When the word is so common as to need no definition. 2nd When the word does not signify a genus or species. 3rd When there is no word in the language to signify the specific difference. 4th When the word signifies things perfectly simple, as time, motion &c. For these reasons many objects occur which cannot be logically defined. When we meet with such words the only way we can define them is, by showing their relation to other words.

Lecture 2nd

Mind The mind is that in man which thinks and reasons. Every person must be conscious of love, hatred &c. We cannot think of any substance without conceiving it to have extension; nor can we conceive of hardness, softness, or other things of like nature without conceiving of some substance to which they belong.

Operations of mind Operations of the mind. By these we understand all the modes of thinking of which we are conscious. To say that the mind loves, hates, &c; and to say that it is inactive imply a contradiction. We therefore contribute to matter, properties, but not operations. The mind possesses a principle of action within

itself, and every action of that principle we call an operation.

Diff. Power & faculty. Every operation supposes a power in the being that operates.

power & faculty. A man may have the power to do any thing and not do it, as for instance, he may have the power of walking but may not wish to put that power in operation. Faculties are applied to those powers that are original; powers, to those acquired. Power cannot exist without the faculty, but the faculty may exist without the power. A power supposes the presence of all those circumstances necessary to the faculty. A man may have the faculty of seeing in the dark or with his eyes bandaged, but he will not have the power.

Capacity. Capacity is that in the constitution of our nature, which by habit & exercise may become power. Man by nature has the capacity of reason & speech, but certain processes are necessary before he can either reason or speak.

Internal & external things of the mind. Things in the mind & things external to it. Things are said to be in the mind, of which the mind is the subject. There are things that cannot exist without belonging to something else. E. g. Color cannot exist except in the substances to which it belongs. Figure, the same way.

Percept. conscious concep- &c. Perception, consciousness, conception, remembrance & imagination. 1st We never perceive things which have no existence, or whose existence we are doubtful. We only conceive or imagine them. Thus perception is distinguished from conception & imagination. Our conceptions are limited by our perceptions. 2nd We perceive external things only. When we are subject to love, hatred, fear &c, we do not perceive them but we are conscious of them. Hence the

Diff of difference between perception & consciousness.

percept
&
conscious
ness 3^d The object of perception must be present. Consciousness is that faculty by which we have an immediate knowledge of what is now passing within our minds. It is an abuse of language to apply it to things past or to external things. We are only conscious of our own thoughts & feelings, but not of those of others. We can only judge of them.

Remem-
brance By remembrance we call to mind things that are past.

Idea The word idea has two meanings, the common definition & philosophical. In its common meaning it signifies the same as notion or thought. To have an idea of a thing is, to apprehend it. In its philosophical meaning, it signifies not any action of the mind, but it is an object of thought. Idea is something by which the mind holds intercourse with matter, or is intermediate between mind & matter.

Sensa-
tion. We use idea as applied to genus or species. Sensation is an act of the mind distinguished from all others in this, that it has no object distinct from the act itself. Pain, for instance is a sensation. When we say we feel pain, pain is not the object of feeling, but it is the feeling itself. Pain is the sensation & the sensation is the pain.

Feeling. Feeling has two meanings. 1st It has the same with perception. In this sense we perceive things by touch. 2nd It is used in the same sense with sensation with this difference, that sensation is used to signify the bodily pleasures & pains that exercise our appetites. But there are feelings of a nobler & higher nature which accompany our affections & judgments in things of taste, to these the word sensation never properly applies.

The word feeling is more extensive than sensation. It embraces all that sensation does & a little more.

Reflection Reflection means an attentive examination of the things in the mind. It means bending back. It is mental activity bending backwards & terminating on the mind.

Diff betw. Refl. & consc. The difference between reflection and consciousness, is that reflection is designed, and voluntary, and consciousness is involuntary.

Lecture 3^d

Hypothesis & analogy Besides ambiguity, hypothesis & analogy afford some instances favorable to the investigation of truth. Hypothesis is merely a conjecture.

Hypothesis of the ancients State any thing to a man, & he immediately has his conjecture. We will give a few examples of the hypotheses of the ancients. E. g. 1st The earth was supposed by them to be a vast plain, surrounded on all sides & with water. This opinion prevailed till the Copernican system overthrew it. 2nd It was supposed that the principle of life in man was his breath.

Descartes 3^d Descartes, born about the middle of the 17th century, founded the theory of vortices. He supposed that all things were carried round as in a vortex. 4th The theory of animal spirits. The Soul was supposed to have her residence in the brain, and to have her messengers to attend to her. And if any thing happened to any member of the body, she despatched one of these messengers ~~which~~ along the arteries, which brought back to her the effect & or feeling that was produced. One thing we may mention with regard to theories, that they may remain for a while and give birth to language, ^{which becomes peremptory} but the theories.

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themselves may be rejected. Few discoveries have been made by means of hypothesis. So much dependence was put in hypothesis, that metaphysics was discarded till the day of Newton & Bacon. A theory must be known before it can be adopted as a cause, or be believed. Newton ^{might} ~~may~~ have said to Descartes, 'Prove your theory of vortices & I will believe it'.

Hypoth when valuable Hypothesis is valuable in the following cases. 1st When it is simple in principle. 2nd When it is supported by analogy. 3rd When it will solve the phenomena. We begin with analogy which is the 2nd. Some philosophers called analogy a correspondence of relations. Things that have a correspondence in some of their parts are said to be analogous. E. g. There is an analogy between the fin of a fish & the wing of a bird, the fish moves by means of the fin & the bird, by its wing. There is a closer analogy between the oar of a boat and

Anatomical system ancient. the wing of a bird. The anatomical system of the ~~system~~ ancients was founded in the following manner. They never bisected the human body, but only those that were the most like the human body, and from the knowledge obtained in this manner, they judged of the human body. The structure of the ears of animals is regulated by the nature of the animal. All ~~birds~~ ^{animals} of prey have the trumpet of their ears turned forward, those preyed upon, have theirs turned backward; the first is so, that they may hear things before them, the others, that they may hear things behind.

A canine tooth is never in connection with a hoof. All hooped animals are gregarious. All canine, are carnivorous. The first case is that all hypotheses should be simple. What renders the works of nature superior to those of art

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is that the works of nature are founded on principles more simple & true. 3^d case It must solve the phenomena. It often happens that more than one hypothesis will solve them. Bacon said "inveniam viam, aut faciam". I will find a way, or I will make

Bacon

Dr. Franklin
theory of
light & elec.

one. The case of Dr. Franklin, in proving that lightning & electricity are the same, is a hypothesis, he at first supposed them ~~them~~ to be the same.

Venus
hyp- of

Arguments from analogy are more valuable to refute an objection than to confirm a truth. We suppose the planet Venus to be inhabited, but we have no proof of this only analogy. If we can prove that it has an atmosphere & that it resembles the earth, we may suppose that it is inhabited as the earth.

Thus there is no analogy between matter and mind. Hypotheses of the mind must be built on analogies of the mind.

The names employed to express the opinions of the mind are supposed to arise from an analogy with matter. E. g. To deliberate means to weigh as in scales. When a man deliberates ~~for~~ performs an act in his mind analogous to weighing in a balance.

He weighs as it were the arguments on both sides, & the more weighty ones preponderate & incline him to that side. To comprehend is to grasp or to embrace any thing, so as to make our fingers meet round it, we then know ~~all~~ about it. A person employs his eyes in observing the works of nature & art. But there is something he cannot understand, without something within his mind to read over these objects as he views them this is intellect. Badges are affected by contact & pressure.

Lecture 4th

Means
of know-
ing the
operations
of the mind

1st

Means of knowing the operations of the mind.
Hypothesis & analogy being set aside as fallacious, what means have we of knowing? 1st Attention to the structure of language. The language of mankind affords a picture of the varieties of the mind. All languages have a plural number, hence we infer that all men have the faculty of abstraction. The pronoun 'we' is not the plural of 'I', nor is 'I' the singular of 'we', but 'we' is a plural without a singular and 'I' is a singular without a plural.

2nd

2nd Attention to the general behavior and conduct of mankind, this is nearly like the 1st. The opinions of mankind may also give some

3rd

knowledge on ~~some~~ this subject. The 3rd & chief source of information is, an attentive reflection to the operations of our own mind.

Man will learn nothing in his own mind by mere consciousness, but he must reflect.

Difficult-
ies to the
forming
1st

Difficulties, to the understanding^{of} these operations. The 1st arises from the rapidity with which thought passes through the ~~rapid~~ mind.

E.g. Look at a skilful musician performing on a flute, & observe the rapidity with which his fingers move. Each movement is preceded by an act of the will, which is also ^{preceded} by a distinct notion of the sound to be produced. Hence we see that thought must pass exceedingly rapid. 2nd A skilful accountant can sum up a list of figures in an instant, or by a mere glance of the eye. 3rd Reading. It has been ascertained ~~that~~ by experiment that 2,000 letters can be pronounced in a minute. 4th An eloquent extemporaneous speaker. There is nothing better calculated

to fill ~~the~~ us with admiration than this.

He passes continually from one thing to another.

2nd Difficulty. His mind is constantly passing from thought to thought, &c. 2nd Difficulty. In examining the operations of the mind we have to oppose habits. 3rd It belongs to the operations of the mind to fix the attention on the object.

There is a curious fact which we may state here, that some people in describing others paint themselves. It may be set down as a property of the passions, to paint themselves. To illustrate this we may take the example of the Devil attempting to paint the Almighty. He gives his own character to the Almighty, calling him envious &c.

4th We are more liable to be misled by words in metaphysics than in any thing else.

In matter, the figures are the representatives of the ideas in the mind.

These difficulties are the reasons why this subject has remained so long in its infancy. The progress of mankind at large is ^{an}alogous to the progress of a single mind in the exercise of its faculties.

Division
of the powers
of mind

Division of the powers of the mind. There are two classes the contemplative & the active, or the understanding & the will.

According to this, the understanding comprehends all those powers, in the exercise of which we perceive, imagine &c; the will, comprehends such as lead to action, such as affection, desire &c.

There can be no act of the will unless it is accompanied with the powers of the understanding.

1st The power of the understanding or the intellectual power is divided into simple apprehension,

judgement & reasoning. The 1st is expressed by a single term; the 2nd by a proposition, the 3^d by a syllogism.

simple & complex ideas We have complex ideas before we have simple ones. Simple ideas are such as are limited to a single notion or perception. Complex ideas are formed out of various simple ones associated together, or contemplated derivatively.

Of the intellectual powers & how divided An enumeration of the intellectual powers, divided according to Reid. 1st Perception & sensation, faculties, of our external senses, exercised by the mind. 2nd Memory. 3^d Conceptions. 4th The power of analyzing complex ideas & of compounding simple ones. 5th Judging. 6th Reasoning. 7th Taste. 8th Moral perceptions. 9th Consciousness. 10. Abstraction. 11th Generalization. 12th Attention.

Perception 1st Perception is that power of the mind by which we become acquainted with the properties of ^{material} objects around us. It is exercised by means of the bodily senses, viz, seeing, hearing, feeling, smelling & tasting. It is the first that comes into exercise. We have an immense variety of perceptions for which we can give no name.

Theories of the ideas of perception We will give the different theories of the ideas of perception that have existed among philosophers. The most ancient was that of Plato.

Plato's According to it there are three first principles of all things, viz, 1st An eternal matter of which all things are made. 2nd Eternal ideas, or immaterial forms or models according to which all things are made. 3^d An efficient cause or deity by which all things are made. The philosophers of the Alexandrian school called the latter Platonic, supposed these ideas

to be only conceptions in Divine understanding.
 Aristotle The next theory is Aristotle's. He founded the
 sect called *peripatetics*. As his theory ~~the~~
 still exists we will spend more time in ex-
 plaining it. According to it, the objects of thought
 first enter the mind by the senses, & are called
 sensible species. These senses may be refined
 & spiritualized so as to become objects of memory.
 E. g. I may say, I saw the moon last night.
 The sensible species of the moon entered my sen-
 sorium last night, & remained there, & I re-
 lect of seeing it. In analyzing the idea of thought
 the mind, according to Aristotle discovers it to
 be a power that has neither extension, figure
 local motion, nor any other property commonly
 ascribed to a body. In analyzing the idea
 of God the mind finds presented to it a being
 necessary & eternally existing, supremely intelli-
 gent, powerful & perfect, the fountain of all
 goodness & truth, & the Creator of the universe.
 Aristotle appears to have clothed, as it were
 the naked ideas of Plato, with the actual ~~for~~
 qualities of the objects perceived; his doctrine
 being, that the sense or being excited by an
 external object, conveys to the mind a real
 resemblance of it; which however, though
 possessing form, color & other qualities of
 matter, is not matter itself, but an unsubstan-
 tial image, like the picture in a mirror;
 as though the mind itself were a ^{kind of} mirror, &
 had the power of reflecting the image of
 whatever object is presented to the external
 senses. This image, in order to distinguish
 it from the intellectual pattern or idea
 of Plato he called a *phantasm*.
 And as he supposed with Plato the exist-
 of an intelligent as well as of a sensible

Phantasm

world, it was another part of his hypothesis that, while things sensible are perceived by sensible phantasms, things intelligible are perceived by intelligible phantasms; and consequently that virtue & vice, truth & falsehood, time, space & number, have all their phantasms as well as material objects, as houses, animals &c. Aristotle's theory gained much by his followers.

Des. Cartes At length arose ~~some~~ Des. Cartes who was born in 1596. He was taught philosophy some of which was absurd, some difficult to be understood, & some of which was true. His philosophy sets out with supposing that every man is under the influence of prejudice & consequently that he cannot know the real truth of any thing till he has thoroughly sifted it. He resolved therefore to place himself in universal doubt, & believe nothing, not even his own existence. He satisfied himself about his own existence by finding out that he thinks, therefore says he 'I must be alive: Cogito, ergo sum, 'I think, therefore I am' He rejected only a part of the peripatetic theory ~~another~~ and retained the rest.

Locke Next comes Locke. He differed from Des. Cartes about our ideas. He believed none were innate. That therefore denies that the powers & faculties of the mind are innate. He differed also with regard to the essence of mind & matter, contending that it was beyond the powers of the human mind. He distinguished between Real & nominal real & nominal essence; the real essence, being that which the thing really is, he said was unknown; the nominal, that by which we have an idea of it. With regard to our sensation he observed that the mind is passive.

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As to the ideas of reflection he ascribes them to no other cause than to the mind itself. He was the first to distinguish between primary & secondary qualities. Extension figure &c he denominated primary, color, heat &c secondary qualities.

Lecture 5th

The existence of a material world which Locke believed was opposed by some.

Berkeley's Berkeley's theory. He believed that there were ideas of spirit without knowledge.

Locke differed from him by believing ideas are the only ~~knowledge~~ ^{objects} of thought.

his Division of ideas Berkeley divides ideas into ideas of sense and ideas of imagination. Ideas of imagination differ from those of sense in being more regular & dependant upon spirits. By sense he means our sensation.

Hence there is no material world: nothing but spirit in the universe.

Hume's Hume's theory. He resolves all operations of the mind into impressions and ideas. Under the 1st, he ranked sensation, passion & emotion. Ideas are the images of these impressions, when we remember them. Hence, no material world.

Malebranche's theory. Malebranche's theory. He was born at Paris 1698. He believed that we perceived objects by ideas only, & supposed that the soul of man was united with the Deity, that the Deity is always present with us & gives us his own ideas of things.

Leibnitz's theory. Leibnitz's theory. He was born at Leipzig in 1646. He invented fluxions about the same time Sir Isaac Newton did.

The conceived the whole universe, mind as well as matter to be composed of Monads. A monad is a simple substance endowed by the Creator with certain active powers, & ~~that~~ is without figure.

It produces in itself all the changes it undergoes by its own powers.

Every human soul is a monad joined to an organized body composed of a number of monads. He distinguished between the different orders of monads on the higher & the lower order. The higher was called dominant & the lower subservient. The dominant belonged to the human body the subservient to plants &c.

He distinguished between perception & apperception. The 1st is peculiar to all monads; the latter to the higher order only. According to this system, the mind has no force on the body, nor the body on the mind. Berkeley in his theory & concluded that the world is a chimaera filled with spirit. According to Leibnitz's theory all our perceptions are the same.

Reflections on the above theories. 1st (Remembering the philosophical definition of idea), the supposition of ideas ~~and~~ ~~contrary~~ contrary to common sense.

2nd The existence of ideas must be self-evident. Argument by Potterfield for ideas. viz. that nothing can act or be acted upon where it is not. We admit that nothing can act or be acted on immediately where it is not. 3rd Minds being in contact with the object ~~do~~ not account for perception or contact does not account for perception. In order to perceive there must be

Different orders of monads

Perception & apperception

Reflections on the above theories

Potterfield's argument of ideas

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a power in the percipient to perceive.

4th The consequences of these theories are sufficient to overturn them. Not to mention the Platonic, or the prepatetic theories, who can bear with any degree of patience to hear of the monads of Spinoza, or of the perception of every thing in God according to Malebranche 5th There is only ~~only~~ one kind of perception that will apply with any degree of probability, viz sight. We therefore reject these theories as useless.

Organs of perception. Of the organs of perception. 1st Impressions made on the organs of sense. We use impressions not as descriptive of the change made on the body, but as the nature of that change.

First law of our nature. The first law of our nature is, that we perceive no object but by means of the organs which God has given us.

We must observe that objects of perception are not substances of bodies, but only their qualities. We perceive color by the eye, Hardness and softness by the touch. Heat by the sensations on feeling. &c.

Acquired perception. When we hear a drum beat, we know that it is a drum from having before seen the drum & the strokes given by the drummer accompanied by with the sound we then hear. This is what is called acquired perception. That is we connect together the drum & the strokes with the sound, & a judgement of these is acquired perception.

Apparent & real magnitude. Real magnitude is the real size of the body, and is measured by some known measure. It is an object of touch, not of sight.

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The apparent magnitude of an object increases as it approaches us, that is, inversely as the distance. It is measured by the angle made by drawing two lines from the extremities of the object & terminating in the eye. These lines form an isosceles triangle of which the object looked at is the base. The apparent magnitude is therefore measured by the angle which the object subtends at the eye. This is called the angle of vision. The apparent magnitude is an object of sight not of touch. Real magnitude has three dimensions length, breadth & thickness. Apparent, only two length & breadth. The real magnitude always remains the same; but the apparent varies as before stated. It is by the apparent magnitude that painters can represent the real ~~size~~ size of objects on surfaces.

Lecture 6th

2nd law
of our
nature

The second law of our nature on perception is that some impression must be made on the organ by the object, or some medium passing from the object to the organ. Of two of our senses, viz touch & taste, there must ^{be} an immediate application of the object to the organ. The effluvia passing from the object to the olfactory nerves are the media of smell. The undulations of sound passing to the auditory are the media of hearing. The rays of light passing from the object to the eye are the media of sight. In order to perception the impression made on the organ must be communicated to the nerves and by them to the brain. There are two sets of nerves. The one subservient to muscular motion.

Nerves

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The other, to sensations & perceptions.

By the first of these we produce changes in the world without us, by means of our bodily observations. By means of the second the world without us produces changes ~~within~~ within

Theories up. We will notice some theories to account to account for the nerves for the manner in which the nerves are subser- being sub- servant to the mind. The ancients supposed the nerves were fine tubes filled with a fluid which they called animal spirits. These were hand-maid, or rather 'aids-de-camp' to the mind which was seated in the brain.

These, acted as before stated in a former lecture. This theory is fallacious, for there has been no fluid discovered in the nerves of the largest animals by the microscope.

Briggs Dr. Briggs believed that the nerves are chords or solid filaments that vibrate like the strings of a violin. This theory has tinged our language, as a man is said to have strong nerves or weak ones, just as if he could tighten or loosen them as the strings of the Theory of violin. The theory of the materialists.

Material-ists They consider that man is a piece of matter so curiously formed, that the impressions made upon it, cause not sensation & perception, but all the other modes of thinking of which we are conscious. They say that man is a homogeneous substance, both mind & body, the same. This theory is more incredible than any of the others. If it were true, we would not be surprized to hear of a telescope being invented which has the power of sight.

Locke said that it was no more difficult for him to conceive of the Deity giving a thinking quality to matter, than of his giving a thinking

substance to it. It is ~~diff~~ inconceivable how Matter ^{can} act on itself, but we know that the mind does.

Lecture 7th

Percep- Of perception. Divided into 3 parts. 1st The
tion. conception or the notion of the object perceived.
Divisions 2nd The irresistible belief of its existence.
3. 3rd This belief is immediate & not the object
of reasoning. 1st It is impossible to see an
object without having some conception of it.
Some people, we may observe, have a more lively
perception than others.
A notion of perception is not to be confounded with
the operations of the different powers of mind.
E. g. A man & a child may both perceive a
steam boat, but their conceptions will be very
different. 2nd There are truths which can be deduc-
ed from other truths previously known, but the
veracity of our senses convince us of the existence
of an object when it acts upon them.
Of sensation. Most of our perceptions have
corresponding sensations. The purposes of
common life do not require that the perception
and the sensation that goes along with it,
should be distinct. The quality perceived
& the sensation are called by the same name.
Perception has an external object distinct
from itself. Sensation has not.
All the names invented for smell, taste, sound
feeling &c, have a like ambiguity. E. g.
It was disputed among ancient philosophers
whether fire had any heat in it. For heat
is a quality in the fire, & also the sensation
felt in the body. There is an ambiguity in
the names of diseases. E. g. The tooth-ache.
Here there is an aching in the teeth, & this

aching causes a pain which is felt or perceived. Also to press our hand on a sharp needle, we feel the pain arising from the insertion of the needle in the flesh, and we also feel the pointedness of the needle. Here we have two different feelings acting at the same time.

The fact of feeling & perception going together is according to an analogy which runs through the whole of our mental constitution. To omit all the feeling or sensations produced by our appetite, the feeling of taste &c, the external senses furnish a great variety of sensations.

Sensations
how
divided

Sensations are divided into agreeable, disagreeable & indifferent. All that we call happiness is made up of sensations.

The sources from which we may derive pleasure are numerous. When we talk about happiness the person that enjoys the happiness must be the judge himself.

Lecture 8th

Use of
our sensa-
tions in
mental econ-
omy.

Remarks on the use our sensations subserve in mental economy. They subserve useful purposes connected with our animal & moral nature. 1st Painful sensations of our animal nature warn us to avoid what is disagreeable to it. 2 Agreeable feelings warn us of what is beneficial & necessary to our existence.

There are agreeable feelings attending our rational nature. These invite us to such pursuits as are useful to society, or in more simple language, as ~~the~~ all truth is either useful to the individual or to society, the investigation of truth itself is a pleasure.

The exercises of the mind which are conversant with morality are attended either with agreeable or painful feelings.

Benevolence is attended with agreeable, malevolence, with painful sensations.

The most painful sensation is remorse.

There are a large class of our sensations which are neither agreeable nor painful.

They are no sooner heard, than forgotten.

E.g. The sensations made by the different voices of mankind are indifferent.

We may take occasion to note the distinction between sensation & perception.

The object of perception is the quality, not the substance of the body.

Primary & Secondary. Locke divided these qualities into primary, & secondary. 1st Primary, are, extension, divisibility, solidity, figure, motion, solidity, hardness, softness, & fluidity. 2^d Secondary, are sound, color, taste, smell, heat & cold. We may also remark that these have different varieties. A distinction was made by the sect called Atomists. The primary they conceived to be the essential qualities of matter.

Whether or not is there a foundation for the distinction of Primary & Secondary?

Distinctness of these qualities according to Reid. As to the Primary, the senses give us a distinct notion of what they are, but as to the secondary they only give us an obscure notion. The senses produce in us a certain sensation with regard to the secondary qualities, but as to what these qualities are, our senses leave us in the dark. The notion we have of Primary qualities is direct not relative. The notion we have of the disorders of the body are much the same as those we

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have of secondary qualities.

Classes of properties. 1st Mechanical powers.
properties as, gravitation, cohesion, magnetism, electricity.
2nd chemical powers. 3^d Medical. 4 Vegetables
& animal powers. These were combined
under manifest & occult.

In the enumeration of the primary qualities
there are some which appear superfluous, as
figure which is nothing but extension.
Motion is also doubted, ^{as being a property of bodies.} The truth is that if
there was no mind, nothing but matter,
there could be no motion. The notion we
have of motion results from memory &
judgement.

Lecture 9th

Matter &
Space

Matter & Space. The objects of
perception of which we have just treat-
ed are called qualities; but quality is
something that cannot exist of itself but
must have some other substance to which
it belongs. We discern nothing but
the properties of matter not matter it-
self; of this we are convinced that all
men are of the same opinion.

The first proof of nature is that proper-
ty always supposes a substance, but
we have no faculties to tell us what the
substance is. The mind is active &
intelligent, but matter is inert
& unintelligent. So much for
matter.

Next comes our notion of Space.

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This is, ^{not} in itself an object of perception
by any of our senses. The notion we have
of Space comes into our minds along with
our ideas of perception of Primary qualities.
Stewart's account of the Difference of Primary
& secondary qualities. The Primary qualities
conveys to the mind a notion of external
locality. Extension seems to be the centre
or substratum of all qualities. It implies
the notion of Space. The notion of space
cannot enter the mind without assistance,
but when it once in it cannot be taken
out. To space we can prescribe no limits.
Its properties are immense, eternal,
indivisible, immovable, & indestructible.
Its centre is every where & circumference
no where. We have no faculties capable
of understanding it.

Lecture 10th

Improvement of our Senses. On the improvement of our Senses.
It is a law of our nature that our active
powers & principles are strengthened by ex-
ercise. Our passive impressions on the
contrary are weakened by repetition.
Being accustomed to distress lessens the
sense of pity, and to scenes of mortality
lessens our apprehension of our own death.
Perception of Danger is a passive excitement
of fear. The soldier, being often exposed
to dangers, at length loses every symptom
of fear. The more battles he is in, the more
ready & willing he is to face the deadly
weapons of the enemy. The more the phy-
sician is conversant with scenes of distress
the less he is affected with pity. He can at
length, in a calm, & unconcerned manner,

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view the most distressing scenes.

It is on this principle that scenes of pity and distress ^{on the stage} are attended with inquisious effects. For when we see real scenes of pity, we are forced to lend our aid to the sufferers, but in fictitious scenes, there is nothing to ~~act~~ ^{impell} us to action. Our feelings of pity are therefore weakened by these fictitious scenes, & are, by that means less easily exercised in cases of real distress.

2 views
of our
senses

Our senses may be regarded in two views
1st In receiving sensations by means of our senses, the mind is passive.
2nd With regard to the means by which the mind receives the qualities of external objects the mind is active.

The disorders of the body indicate their presence by the feelings which they produce.

What we have said of our painful sensations hold true with regard to our agreeable ones. It is only with regard to the 2nd law that we receive our acquired perception.

By sight we have two original perceptions, color & distance.

Improved
attention

Our senses are susceptible of improvement by attention. E. G. A blind person can distinguish different objects by feeling. or a person deprived of any ^{one} of his senses can supply its place to a certain extent by the application of his others.

Lecture 11th

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Attention is the proper way by which perception may be improved. There are many artificial contrivances which are great aids to some of the senses. E. g. A telescope enables us to perceive objects at a greater distance from us ~~th~~ or at a distance at which we could not naturally perceive them at all without it. Also, a microscope enables us to perceive such objects as are too small for our naked eyes to behold. Another way of improvement is, by observing the connection in objects between their sensible & latent qualities. E. g. Bread is nutritive.

Wine accelerating. Opium narcotic. These are all latent qualities. So uniformly has the Creator joined these two together, that when we see the one we presume the other. But if these did not go together our condition in life would be deplorable. Our lives would be spent in continual alarm. The farmer after sowing his ground with what he supposed to be wheat might have his hopes blasted by a growth of cockle. &c.

The Fallacy of the senses. That the senses are fallacious is an opinion which has extensively prevailed, but how far this opinion is true is the question now to be considered.

The only proper instance in which our senses give us wrong information is when the body is under some disease. For when a person is sick nothing has its natural taste.

A partial testimony of the senses or ignorance of the laws of nature is a cause of their fallacy. E. g. A miraculous operation called Transubstantiation is believed in the Romish Church in which the elements of the eucharist are supposed to be changed into the real body and blood of Christ. They believe that when

Artificial
aids to our
senses.

Sensible
&
latent
qualities.

Fallacy
of the
Senses

Transub-
stantiation

they do eat the bread & drink the wine used in the sacrament of the Lord's Supper, they eat his real body & drink his real blood.

These opinions were propagated in the days of Martin Luther who changed the word transubstantiation into consubstantiation. He believed that the body & blood of Christ are present in, with, & under the elements of bread & wine.

Many false judgments called deceptions of the senses, are founded on the principle of judging by the false or partial testimony of the senses.

The second class of errors arises from an ignorance of the laws of nature.

E. g. If we knew not the laws of reflection of light we would be liable to many false conclusions with regard to the position of objects, but when we understand these laws, and that we see objects in the direction in which the rays of light are last reflected, we can ~~then~~ refer them to their true position.

Memory, according to Reid's Definition is that faculty by which we have an immediate knowledge of things past.

1st Memory must have an object, and this object is distinct from memory itself. In remembrance we have a full conviction of the existence of objects. It implies also a conviction of our own continued existence since the time we saw the objects, and a notion of personal identity, and likewise a notion of past relations.

Memory is a most important faculty, necessary in all reasonings &c. and of great utility in the ordinary concerns of life.

Theory, to account for ~~perception~~ memory.

1st This theory supposes the impressions made on

They to account for memory.

The organs pass to the brain & are retained there

2nd. That the relics of these impressions on the brain is memory. 3rd That the relics are not always perceptible, but visible at one time & invisible at another.

Objections to this theory.

This theory is liable to two objections. 1st It accounts only for a reviewed perception of former perceptions. 2nd We remember that which we never perceived. E.g. Our imaginations & ideas &c.

Secture 12th

The remembrance of things sometimes occur spontaneously, and sometimes with difficulty & research. The general term memory applies to the first, & recollection to the last.

Reminiscence

Reminiscence is a word which has lately been adopted, & which seems to designate those exercises of the memory, in which it is aided by certain feelings which were awakened by scenes about which we were formerly conversant.

2 powers of memory

There seems to be two powers in memory. 1st A capacity to retain the particulars which compose the stock of our knowledge. 2nd A power to recall these particulars. People in whom the former predominate are said to have retentive memories, those in whom the latter prevail, ready memories. This difference is very obvious. It has been supposed that a good memory is seldom connected with a great genius, but from the examples which can be adduced to the contrary, we are inclined to believe that this opinion is not correct.

Qualities of a good memory.

Qualities of a good memory. These are susceptible. 1st susceptibility. 2nd retentiveness. 3rd readiness. A susceptible memory easily commits anything

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but soon forgets it. A retentive memory commits any thing with difficulty, but can retain what it does commit. With regard to the last we deem it unnecessary to say any thing. We seldom see all three of these combined in the same person. One, results from a particular species of mental constitution, another from a different species, &c.

Distinction
of properties

Attention
& association
of ideas

It will be a useful investigation to inquire into the distinction of ^{these} properties. We will first inquire what principles are most intimately connected with memory. These are attention & the association of ideas. Thoughts are continually passing our minds, many of which are never thought of again, and no attention ^{being} paid to them as they pass. Passion fixes the attention & attention the memory. Another proof of the influence of attention is the fact every one has experienced in attempting to commit a piece of writing to memory by merely reading it over without paying any attention to it. We find that we can commit a great deal faster by paying particular attention to the piece as we read it over.

Our ideas are associated together, ^{1st} by means of signs. 2^d By means of certain connections established ~~means~~ by nature. by means of our different faculties. 3^d By means of relations, some casual & obvious, others permanent & belonging more intimately to the nature of the ideas themselves, & less open to superficial observation. 1st by signs. Some of these signs are natural & other artificial. The natural have a greater influence over the memory than the artificial. We can always tell the feelings of a person, as when he is angry or pleased &c, by his looks or natural signs, if these signs are not over-

come by artificial signs. Artificial signs

Artificial
signs

have two properties, 1st in aiding our apprehension of the objects, & 2nd in aiding us to recollect them.

E. g. A Diagram in Geometry gives us a clearer conception of the theorem and also assists us in remembering it. The reason the Diagram assists the memory is because it gives a better apprehension of the thing to be remembered. A person can remember what he understands better than what he does not. Written words are addressed to the eye & ears both, spoken words only to the ears.

We remember what we read longer than what we hear, because it is addressed to two of our senses.

Hence we conclude that which is addressed to the most of our senses will be longest remembered.

There is no connection between the words & the things for which they stand. General terms are of great use to assist the memory. We find it difficult to combine together any number of particulars in the memory unless they are associated together by some general term.

Lecture 13th

Those objects that excite the greatest number of our senses will be longer retained. Any thing that excites both sight & hearing will be remembered longer than if it only affected one of these senses. We have an example of this in reading a piece, & hearing it read.

Relation

The next thing is relation. The relation that exists between things is either discernible to the senses, or ~~is~~ not to be discerned without the higher powers of the mind, as judgement & reason. In the former case, we notice resemblance, contrariety, & contiguity of time & place. To the latter belong the relation of cause & effect, purposes & conclusions &c. There are many of these relations peculiar to the different branches of science,

such as geometrical relations, logical, medical, & moral relations, relations between events & objects as they occur in the course of life, called contingent relations. These relations take the strongest hold upon the generality of mankind, as they principally concern them in their various pursuits of life. E. g. The relation that exists between creditor and debtor.

Philosophical
al minds
how govern
ed.

Philosophical minds are governed more by associations that are influenced by the last class. Such minds are not apt to dwell on things applied to the senses, but on those that are applied to their intellectual powers. When a variety of particulars have been presented to the minds of philosophers, the principles only are retained, & the particulars escape their notice. Some people can remember the particulars but not the principles on which they depend. One may be called the casual the other the philosophical memory. Those who possess the former, may on some occasions appear to know more than the latter. Those who possess the latter.

Improvement of
memory.

Of the improvement of memory. It may be improved two ways. 1st By exercise. 2nd Through the improvement of the other intellectual powers. The 1st is not capable of ~~improvement~~ explanation, as it is an evident fact. It is a particular case of that law by which all our senses are improved by exercise.

Analysis of the ways in which memory is improved by the exercise of the other senses. 4 ways. 1st By giving a greater command of attention. 2nd By confining the attention to those things among the objects of our knowledge, which are of primary importance. These two going together are called by the phrenologist concentrativeness. 3^d By bringing under our view a greater number of relations.

among the objects of our knowledge. 4th By the formation & strengthening of habits of philosophical arrangements & classification.

The more we know on any subject the more interesting it becomes to us. It truth has charms to captivate every generous mind. A contempt for any branch of useful knowledge arises from total ignorance. The more we know the better we can compare our knowledge to what we don't know.

With regard to the 3^d method, the analogy of relation between different things will be more evident the more our knowledge is increased. The more we know of things the greater number of analogies will be brought in between things.

Result of the foregoing observations! "Summing up the whole the best way to improve the memory, is to reduce the subject to a systematic form.

2^d Having fixed the general principles according to their general order, return again & connect leading principles with subordinate ones. 3^d Review the whole according to the order in which you have arranged them. This is precisely the way an extemporaneous speaker arranges his speech.

Lecture 14th

Conception

Of Conception. This is an act of the mind by which we have a notion of some perception. ~~which~~ By conception we are presented with a transcript of what we have seen. We have the power of modifying our conceptions various ways. Of different conceptions. By combining together different parts we can form new combinations of our own. Reid calls conception a power by which we have a knowledge of abstract means & operations. There is a difference between Reid & Stewart with regard to conceptions. Reid maintains that conception is distinguish

Reid's
definition
of concep-

Diff. be- from perception in this, that the latter
tween R. & Stewart. is ^{not} distinct from its object, & that our concep-
tions are not attended with a belief of their
objects. Stewart maintaining that our concep-
tions are ^{always} attended with a belief of objects.
We judge of the reality of things by our percep-
tions. We judge of the objects of conception by
comparing them with objects of perception.
In cases where such comparisons cannot be
made we take our conceptions for realities.
This last case may be much diversified.
1st When conception is exercised & perception
not. E. g. In Dreams; we are often frightened
or pleased by the objects of our imagination.
2nd. When the attention has been so long fixed
on certain objects of conception that perception
is forgotten, then perceptions are taken for
conceptions. This accounts also for hypochon-
driacal people. If our philosophy be true
real pain never fails to banish the wild im-
aginations of such people.
3^d. When the exercise of perception is so faint
that it cannot be distinguished from concep-
tion. Of all our conceptions, those that are
borrowed from the sight are most lively.

Lecture 15th

Attention.

Attention is that act of the mind by
which we notice any object of perception on
consciousness. When employed about the
former it is called observation, when about
latter, reflection. It is distinguished from
perception & consciousness by its being vol-
untary. Its importance with regard to
memory has been shown. It is by atten-
tion we derive all our knowledge, for study
is nothing but a continuation of attention.

There are many things that pass the mind unnoticed, both of perception & consciousness. The question arises then, how to account for this. There are two ways. 1st. The mind may be occupied about something else so intensely that it does not notice these things. or 2nd, It may be owing to the rapidity of the transitions that the objects make. The former has been called absence of mind. It has been supposed to indicate a peculiar strength of mind, but is rather a sign of a weak mind.

Stewart's opinion with regard to this question is, that our attention is much engaged about other things that we give no attention to these that pass the mind unnoticed.

Another cause of the rapidity of thought is when we wish to make our thoughts the objects of attention. E.g. When we view a landscape we see different objects, the size of which & the distance between them we at once judge. Many processes are gone through before we make this decision, but the processes are so rapid that we cannot notice them. There is a difference of

opinion between Reid & Stewart, as to whether the processes the mind goes through when improved by habit, is the same as before. E.g. Whether a person in playing on a musical instrument, a flute for example, goes through the same processes after he becomes a skillful player, as he did when he first began to play. Reid maintains that the process is essentially changed by habit, while Stewart maintains that habit does not change the process as to its nature. We agree with Stewart.

When the habit is formed the acts of the attention, or the processes are so rapid that we do not notice them. We can exert acts of

R. & St.
opinion
about the ra-
pidity of thought

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attention yet not notice these acts themselves. There is an analogy between time & space. We speak of things near in time & near in space, & also distance of time & space. When an object occupies less than a certain portion of space, it cannot be noticed, so when an act occupies less than a certain portion of time it cannot be noticed. Stewart says that the 10th part of a second can be noticed.

In attention there seems to be two efforts employed 1st An effort by which we exclude other things from the view of the mind. 2nd An effort to retain such things as the mind wishes to examine.

The rapid transitions of thought is a difficulty to contemporaneous speakers. So many thoughts pass through his mind at once that he becomes confused & cannot deliver them in their proper place. The supposition of a power to attend to two things at once is unnecessary.

Lecture 16th

Abstraction Of Abstraction. Every object of thought is one. i.e. Every being on which our attention is fixed is an individual. But the material objects are many, & the intellectual or immaterial are also many. And it would be impossible to get names for all the material & immaterial objects. Nature has provided for this difficulty by giving the power to use words to denote classes. This comes by abstraction. Of all the nine parts of speech all are general except the noun substantives, and some of these are general. General words when employed in a proposition render the proposition general. In these remarks all philosophers will agree, but in accounting for the nature of the process they differ. Here before going into an explanation we

What is the nature of the idea? I must refer to the theory of ideas. What is the nature of the idea corresponding to a general term? As in this line from Pope, "The proper study of mankind is man" - what idea comes up to the mind when repeating 'Man'?

3. Ans. To the first of these questions three answers have been given. 1st. That the object of the mind when employed about any ^{general} speculation, is the idea of the genus or species denoted by the general term, and that this idea is a real thing that existed from eternity, being the model after which the Deity formed all things; - that it existed in every genus or species, without modification making the essence of the species; - that it is that which each individual of ^{the} genus or species has in common with the rest, and which entitles it to be classed with them; and lastly, that these ideas remain unchanged under all the alterations the individual may suffer, & therefore the only proper objects of sense, the truths of which like these ideas are eternal & immutable. The supporters of this theory are called Realists.
- 2nd Ans. on the opinion of the Conceptualists. The second answer is, that the objects of our attention when we use general terms is a conception embracing the attributes belonging to the class of individuals of which the general term is the sign, or in other words the meaning of the general term. The supporters of this theory are called ~~conceptualists~~ conceptualists. The third answer is that the object of attention, when we use a general term, is nothing else than the general term itself. The ~~third~~ ^{ans.} advocates of this theory are called nominalists. The Pythagoreans, Platonists, and their followers among the schoolmen, are of the Realists. Locke & Reid are of the Conceptualists. Hobbes, Berkeley, Hume, Campbell & Stewart are of the Nominalists. Stewart has summed up the

Stewart, doctrine of the Conceptualists in two heads.
on the doctrine of the Conceptualists.

First, we have no reason to believe in the existence of universal ideas. In this the Conceptualists & Nominalists agree.

Second, the mind has the power of reasoning concerning the general, without the use of language. Stewart thinks that the only difference is in thinking without words.

Difference.

Reid.

Burkley

& Hume.

Reid thinks there are general conceptions & general ~~words~~ terms. But all these authors fail in noticing a distinction which we think exists. Burkley & Hume think there are no general ~~terms~~ conceptions. But they used the word conception in one sense, & Reid in another. If by conception we mean an act of the imagination, it must be a conception of some particular thing, or in the line from Pope, of some particular man. But if it is an act of the understanding it is general; and in Reid's sense, a notion of a genus or species.

Lecture 17th

What Reid calls general conceptions is the same the Platonists call ideas, only they have no existence. Things merely conceived and understood have neither beginning of time nor place; they are merely abstractions. That is, necessary truths always did, & always will exist the same. The word ideas ought to be confined to the meaning applied by the Platonists. I will give you now my own views on this subject.

D^r Wylie's
views
1st

Abstraction of the imagination and abstraction of the understanding. First, by attention we are capable of making any certain quality of an individual object subject to our consideration without any

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of the other qualities. E. g. We can consider the color of matter without considering its hardness or any of its other qualities. Yet we do not consider this one on the supposition that there are no others, but we choose to consider it alone by abstraction.

2nd Second. We are able to judge whether two or more properties resemble other properties. This implies comparison. Milk, snow, linnen & some other things agree in whiteness, hence it is said to be a property of them all; or in the language of the schools, predicable to them all. I will here

2^{kind} again remark that there are two kinds of abstraction, viz, that of the imagination and that of the understanding.

Abstraction of the imagination. I mean those separations the mind makes of any one or more of its conceptions, that agree with it in the archetype. Thus, the rose is an object which affects the sight & smell, but we can conceive of the color without the smell; or we can conceive of qualities perceptible by one sense abstracted from those perceived by another, but not from those of the same sense, nor from some particular subject to which they belong. E. g. We can conceive of whiteness which is perceptible by the eye, abstracted from roughness which is perceptible by the touch, but it is impossible to conceive of whiteness without extension, both being perceptible by the eye. We can separate in the imagination the parts of object from one another. By the abstraction of the imagination can be formed no abstract general conceptions. The abstraction of the imagination is necessary in poetry & painting. But much as the poet and painter can do, they can only separate the component parts & form new combinations.

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Abstraction of the understanding. By abstraction of the understanding I mean the power of fixing the attention on any object with the power of excluding every thing else. e. g. We can fix the attention on extension without color, - hence we can form an abstract notion of it. We can fix our attention on length without breadth. This is called an abstraction. Another difference is, that by the abstraction of the understanding we can abstract a quality from its subject, whereas we can not conceive of them apart. The notion of a quality without referring to any particular subject is an abstraction of the understanding. I use the word Notion or Conception as an act of the understanding; & conception of the imagination. We can not conceive of whiteness in the abstract but we can have a notion of it without bringing up any thing else.

Lecture 18th

Attributes We can form no abstract notion of such a notion of thing as virtue or goodness; but we can have such, as a general notion of it. There must then be virtue &c. general attributes, & we can form general notions of them. virtue goodness & the like genera are called attributes. There is another attribute or species but called genera or species. Things are parcelled into kinds & sorts by men. Those agreeing in certain attributes are thrown together & a certain name is given to them. General term defined. The general term directly denotes the class of things to which it implies, as characterized by the properties the individuals in the class have in common. - yet so as that in its application to individuals it does not exclude such properties as may be peculiar to the individual. If this were not the case there could be no

Conception
&
Notion
H.C.

~~no~~ general terms denoting species or genera; for no two things in nature are exactly alike. The more general the generic name the fewer particulars will be included under it. We can not conceive of a triangle neither scalene nor rectangular any more than we can draw it on the board; - but we can have a notion of it. A conception must be of a particular thing; and it can not be an absurdity. But we can have a notion without embracing particulars. The word 'man' is a general term. But every individual has peculiarities both of body and mind. But these peculiarities are not important, for it matters not whether he be large or small, black or white, he is still a man, and is regarded 'or should be' regarded as such by the law. But if he has not reason the distinguishing characteristic of man, he is no longer regarded as such by the law. A perception must have peculiarities, a notion need not have any.

Lecture 19th

Use of
general
terms.

Of the use of general terms. There are two ways we can speculate about classes of objects. First, by means of general terms. Second, by means of one particular individual, or the name of it, employed as a representative of the whole class. In ancient times when language was in its infancy but few general terms were employed. The more a nation is advanced in civilization & mental culture, the more general terms are found in the language. It is manifest that we can conduct a course of reasoning by these two processes. What is the necessity for supposing general notions? In both the ways mentioned in order to reason intelligently, we must know

the extent of the class the for which the
the term stands; or we must know what Locke
calls the nominal essence of the class. This
knowledge is just what we mean by a gen-
eral notion, or what Reid calls a general
conception, or in other words the meaning
of the general term. The point of dispute

Disputed point whether the representative quality is in the
word or in the idea corresponding to it. It
appears to me to be in both, but in the notion
first. Since we can use notions or ideas
that are general, what is the use of language?
What is the use of adopting general terms?
The Nominalists would say from necessity
But this is too strong. It is rather from
convenience. Although a very long process
of reasoning perhaps could not be conducted
without general terms, for they serve as a
bandage or tie in which are included several
ideas. Though I do not say there is an abso-
lute necessity to use a general term yet in
such a case it approaches almost to it.

We will now mention the general classes
of general terms found in all languages.

General
classes
of general
terms.

I will here remark that the same classi-
fication of thoughts has been made in all ages
& nations. This is accounted for from the fact
that human nature is always the same.

1st First, such as denote natural substances.
This arrangement is made by nature & not by man.

2nd 2nd Those that denote the natural actions
of men & other living beings. Here caution
is required not to use the general term in a
vague sense. 3^d 3^d Such as denote the natural
relations of men as Father, Son, &c.

4th 4th. Terms of art are correspondent in all

Languages, but not so much as the others

5th 5th Those that denote the different characters of men, by which they are either useful or pernicious to society

6th Sixth. Those that denote the various manners, relations, practices & notions which belong to the various pursuits of mankind.

Lecture 20th

Association of ideas By association of ideas is meant that law of our nature by which things are connected by observation and experience, & by certain relations connected in the memory. The law of association of ideas is unassailable, founded in nature, & testified to by experience. The principles of association as given by Hume are Resemblance, Contiguity of time & place, cause & effect. This enumeration is not complete. For any relation between the thoughts of our mind & the signs by which they are connected, may serve as a means of association. How far the mind has the power of controlling the thoughts is not easy to say, being different in different persons. The power of summing up a number of thoughts at pleasure is acquirable.

A person too can select a thought out of a number & make it the object of attention by practice. To be able to do this is very important in extemporaneous speaking.

Influence of Association on memory 4 laws Law of association influencing the memory. 1st Its influence over speculative opinions 2nd Over matters of taste. 3rd Over active principles. 4th Over moral judgements.

Exerted on the 1st 3 ways 1st The power of association over our speculative opinions. This influence is exerted in three ways 1st By blending together things really distinct in

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their nature E. G. We find it impossible to conceive of color without extension, though there ~~the~~ is no more necessary connection between color and extension than there is between extension and solidity. 2nd Misleading us in anticipating

the future by the past. This takes place by confounding things accidental with things permanent. E. G. Regarding some days as lucky & some unlucky. Stewart says, we are apt to have a contemptible opinion of the intellect of those who believed in these things in former times. This is unjust as it does not depend on reason, but on observation

3^d By connecting in our mind, errors important with truths. There is a kind of sacredness in all truths, but in some, more than in others. In all religions where error is connected with truth, the error becomes sanctified. The easiest way to separate the error from the truth is to reject all. Indolent minds will either do this or swallow all.

When religion becomes over-loaded with follies & absurdities, atheism is sure to follow. Then comes what we call eclecticism, which consists in taking the excellencies of all & forming a new system. Similar movements also take place in the political world.

Lecture 21st

2nd Second. The influence of Association over our judgements or opinions in matters of taste. Its influence here is greater than in the last case, because our judgements in matters of taste are connected with great pleasure or disgust as the case may be. This influence appears in the modes of dress, the words and phrases we use, our form of behavior &c.

Fashion

The constant change of the fashions is accounted for on the principle of association. There is a difference of rank even in our own country. Those of the high rank wish to be distinguished from the others by their modes of dress, behavior &c. While the lower classes wishing to destroy this distinction, imitate them. The higher class will then adopt something else &c. In these changes it sometimes happens that a form is introduced which is beneficial or convenient, which is retained. In the eastern or oriental countries the forms of dress do not change because different castes or classes are so distinctly & permanently marked out, that it would be impossible for them to destroy the distinction. The above remarks will apply to forms of speech. Third, this power of association even introduces new principles, or it may generate new passions. Avarice or loving money for its own sake is an instance of this. It is not a natural passion, but it is formed in this way. We find that money will procure both what is necessary for our existence, and that which renders life pleasant & agreeable. We at length get it associated with these & at last desire it for its own sake.

Avarice

4th

The same law of association has a powerful influence over our moral judgements or judgments of right & wrong. When we judge of a thing as right or wrong, which is not right or wrong of itself but from associations, our judgement is perverted. From detesting poverty we get to hate the poor, by association. Often too do we see the poor blamed & sometimes punished for a crime which would be overlooked in the rich. "Through tattered garments small vices do appear, robes & fine gowns hide all" (Shakspeare)