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
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Richardson

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Moral & Philosophical

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By

Richardson

Author of the

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Lectures
On
Moral Philosophy

Delivered
By
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Indiana University.

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Political Philosophy

Political Philosophy, though not a science, is a study of the principles of government, and of the rights and duties of the citizen. It is a subject of the highest importance, and one which should be studied by every man.

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Moral Philosophy.

Moral Philosophy treats of the principles and rules of moral obligations: which are not derived from revelation, but from reason, thus bringing the philosopher and Christian on the same ground.

This subject is divided in Ethics, Politics, Economics, & Jurisprudence.

1. Ethics relates to personal duties and obligations.
2. Politics relates to the constitution and government of civil communities or states. —
3. Economics relates to the constitution and government of families.
4. Jurisprudence respects and comprises the enactment and administering of the laws of a state. —
 1. Ethics.

From whence are derived those rules of moral obligation which should govern man? We answer, from the nature of man himself. We consider what the designs of nature are, and from this we deduce the principles by which he should be governed. This investigation is rendered extremely difficult from the complicated nature of man, and especially from the fact that he is a fallen being, having lost his original nature. And hence the difficulties would be still more increased, if we should take any of his present impulses and passions as being right. Now, then, shall we know what is right, and what is wrong, in our nature. We answer, only by considering the natural light of reason and conscience. These, to a great extent, have remained uninjured, and unimpaired by man's fall. Our next duty is to define what man is — or, be able to distinguish him from all other beings. Philosophers have made various attempts to accomplish this, and, what is remarkable, have all disagreed. The following are the "Specific differences", by which they have supposed man to differ from other animals. —

1. Exterior Form, (Ovid. Book 1.).

Ethics

2. The organization of the human body.

Socrates makes man to differ from the lower animals by the organization of the human hand.

3. Reason, including Conscience. These govern man's nature, but Instinct, that of brutes; and they differ from each other in the following particulars.

1. Instinct operates within a more narrow and limited sphere than reason; but the latter continually enlarges the sphere of its operations. The former is stationary, but the latter progressive. The swallow builds no better nest now than she did under the rafters of Noah's Ark; but there is a vast difference in the construction of a city palace, and the rude wigwam of the savage.

Again: Within its limited sphere, instinct is less fallible than reason. —

4. The next specific difference is Articulate Speech.

5. Memory and Foresight.

6. Sense of Religion. Of this no indications have ever been given by brutes.

7. Usability. All creation, says Shaftsbury, is gross but man. He might have excepted the monkey!

8. Man is a cooking animal.

Remarks. The most honorable of all these distinctions is Reason and Conscience, and so far as man is governed by these, he is elevated above the brute creation. He who glories in those qualities which he has in common with the brutes, degrades his own nature; but he who is governed by those principles by which he differs from the inferior animals, elevates himself in the scale of animal existence. —

Unity of the human race. There are five varieties of the human race.

1. The Caucasian, occupying Western & Eastern Asia, North Africa, Hindostan, Europe, & N. & S. America.

Ethics

Characteristics. Color, ruddy; Hair long, smooth and fair; Head, spherical; Face, oval; Nose, arched; Mouth, small; Chin, round; & Features, regular.

2. Tartar, or Mongolian Race, inhabiting Eastern Asia, and the neighboring islands.

Characteristics. Color, yellow; Hair, black, stiff and straggled; Head, square; Face, large, flat & depressed; Nose, small; Chin, prominent; Opening between the eyes, narrow and oblique.

3. The American; or Aborigines, inhabiting N. & S. America.

Characteristics. Color, copper; Hair, black, smooth; forehead, receding; face, short.

4. Malay or Australian, inhabiting Oceania. Color tawny; Hair black; Forehead flat; Upper jaw large, and projecting.

5. Negro; inhabiting South and West Africa; or the Torrid Zone.

Characteristics. Color, black; Hair, short and woolly; Head narrow; Face, round; Forehead, convex; Cheek bone, projecting; Nose, flat; Lips, thick; Ears, long, &c. Some authors reduce these five varieties, to only three, (viz) European, Asiatic, & African, deriving the American variety from the European & Asiatic; and the Malays, from the European & African. Several authors, including Buffon, rejecting the Mosaic account of the creation, have derived man from the monkey; affirming that he wore his tail away by rubbing it against the trees! Others, without inventing any theory to account for the creation of man, are content with simply denying the Mosaic account, on the grounds that the great diversity in the varieties of man, forbid the idea of a common origin. To this we answer.

1. The difference in the varieties of the human species is not so great, as is known to exist in the inferior animals. Thus the hog, on the Island of Cuba, has grown to twice its original size.

2. How very different is the modern Italian, from the ancient Roman? or the modern, from the ancient Grecian? Animal stock is susceptible of great improvement or de-
generacy.

And the same is true of the modern Englishman, when compared with the Saxon & Norman, from whence he is derived.

3. Difference in color appears to be a serious objection: but this may be accounted for in a great measure by climate; food, &c. The Jews, it is observed, invariably have the color of the inhabitants in whose country they live. Other objections may be removed by considering, the habits of life, diet &c. of the different nations of the globe.

Man, as an individual.

Man is a compound of body and soul: Of the soul we remark

1. It is immaterial; and this is evinced by its properties.

The following objections are urged to its immateriality:

1. The soul seems to grow and decline with the body: We answer, not always. Infants of remarkable precocity have evinced the mental powers of the man; and men of mature and sound bodies have exhibited the imbecility of childhood, in the case of idiots. Dr Watts, it is said, could read Latin when only four years old.

2. Even in unorganized nature active properties are evinced, as electricity, caloric, gravitation; and why not then, may not mind be a function, or property of matter? And in organic matter, this objection to the soul's immateriality, is favored by the analogy of the vegetable principle of life, to animal life. Plants even evince something like intelligence. The bean, and other creeping plants, instinctively, it seems, seek support from the stick placed in any direction from it.

The sensitive plant appears almost to possess feeling, if not intelligence: and when touched will immediately shrink up, as if fleeing from danger. Numerous anecdotes of Ogs, monkeys, elephants, & horses could be given, in which they appear to be gifted with reason. Shall we consider these facts as the existence of a rational soul - the result of material organization? These questions are hard to answer, and are left for your consideration.

Immortality of the Soul.

1. The first argument in favor of the immortality of the soul is derived from its immateriality, or spirituality. This is the argument: Nothing perishes by annihilation; the destruction of matter is nothing but its change of form or decomposition; now the soul, being immaterial, cannot thus perish, and hence when the body dies, the soul cannot die with it. This is not a conclusive argument: there is no reason why the deity who creates a soul, may not if it pleases him; destroy it: and hence, whether the soul be spiritual or material, its immortality does not depend upon these qualities, but entirely on the will of God.
2. The hope of immortality, which is the strongest in virtuous minds; Our rational nature is endowed with this hope; and as God is its author, it is unreasonable to suppose that He would disappoint man.
3. The next argument is derived from remorse of conscience; the effect of which is to cause the wicked to dread a future state of rewards and punishments.
4. Man has an order of faculties above his present condition, which seems to argue that he is destined for a superior state of existence. "What a piece of work is man! How noble in reason! how infinite in faculties! in form, and moving, how express and admirable! in action, how like an angel! in apprehension, how like a god! Can it be possible that man, thus endowed, is destined only for the ignoble, the short and fleeting scenes of this present life? It cannot be; immortality is his.
5. The immateriality of the soul is necessary to render complete the correspondence between the world of mind and the world of matter. Look around on the material universe; contemplate the grandeur of the heavens; in a word, all the sublimities of nature, and ask, is the human soul inferior to these? Is it not gifted with a duration as infinite as these works are lofty and sublime?

7. Our moral habits and intellectual become stronger & stronger till the end. Intellectually and morally man is a progressive being. Is it not probable that this progressive improvement is destined to end only when eternity itself shall find an end?

8. The unequal Distribution, of rewards and punishments on this world points to a future state of existence.

9. The Desire of posthumous fame affords a reasonable argument for the immortality of the soul.

10. The tendency of this belief is good: the tendency of the opposite belief is bad. A good effect cannot arise from a bad cause: men are guided into the paths of happiness by truth, never by error: hence the belief itself must be true. Reflection. All of the above arguments in favor of the immortality of the soul, are manifestly derived from the idea of the being or existence of a God.

What is the natural state of man?

The question often arises, Is man's natural state, a state of peace or war? This question is difficult to determine positively or negatively, as the truth lies on both sides, to some extent, depending on what we consider man's natural state to be. If by this, we mean that antecedent to a state of civilized society, his state is that of war; because here every man must necessarily be his own avenger, and person and property are not defended and secured by law. But suppose his ^{state} natural state to be that to which he naturally tends. Look into man's nature, and you will find it pacific: and indeed he may be said, only to love war because he loves peace more. It is for peace he fights: It is thus he emerges from a state of nature to that of civilization. We may suppose men, in a savage state, unrestrained by any law, to attack each other for the sake of plunder, or revenge. A mutual desire for protection will induce the injured parties to unite against a common enemy. This is the origin of civil government: and thus it ever has for its object the

* Thing believed.

protection of person and property. Any thing that goes beyond this is not within the scope of government.

Nothing is more absurd than for the civil authorities to interfere and dictate in matters of religion. Our own government has been the first to regard this plain dictate of common sense, in leaving every man to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience.

() As man's natural state, that of a savage, or of a civilized being. Under the supposition that man's natural state is that to which he tends by nature, we must answer this question negatively. We here offer several reflections.

The vices of men in a savage, are not so numerous as in a civilized state, but they are more violent and atrocious.

The savage sometimes offers up her infant to appease some offended deity, or sells them into servitude. In connexion with this

we may remark that a savage life, can never be a happy one. Civilization brings with it blessings to which the savage is a stranger. The poor of England, says the Lecturer, are happier, than the savages of North America; and the slave of the United States, than his brethren in Africa.

When a nation has degenerated to a certain point in a savage state, history presents no instance of its ever, by its own unaided exertions, emerging, and assuming a civilized state. Will the degenerate offspring of the Indians of our country, whom the many monuments and ruins in Mexico, Yucatan, Guatemala, prove to have lived in a degree approximating to civilization, ever recover the original condition of their fathers? The bad success of the missionaries, prove how difficult it is to reclaim a fallen being.

() Man is a social being. He is born in Society, for Society, is a part of Society, and has obligations resting upon him from which he cannot escape. We will find from a constitution of his powers and inclinations that he is formed and designed for Society— Thus;

() 1. His sympathy, which demands the commiseration of friends,

2. His powers of imitation. 3 Instinctive belief, which induces him to repose confidence in a fellow being.

4 His deference to the opinions of others. No man likes to stand alone in his opinion, and the more he induces to adopt it, the more strongly is he convinced of its truth.

5 The power of speech, on the one hand, and a curiosity to hear on the other. Indeed the word sociality has almost become synonymous with the power of conversing well.

6. The active powers of man can only receive their proper stimulus from society, and as the duties imposed on him require a vigorous exercise of these powers, he is evidently destined to be a social being. It may be observed that the stronger the stimuli, the more violent will be the excitement, and consequently he will wear out the sooner. It is said that a literary or business man in a large city, on an average, lives about ten years less than a man in different circumstances.

7. There is one respect in which man is not a social being, — that which is forbidden by a sense of modesty. I will leave it for you to determine whether eating is an act belonging to man as a social being.

8. Our last remark is, Interest leads to Society.

We have now viewed man in his social character, and from hence deduce his capacities for enjoyment.

1. Those consisting in his senses, appetites and animal feelings.

2 His aesthetical powers, or taste and imagination.

3 Those consisting in his affections.

4 Those consisting in his desires and hopes.

5 The capacities of enjoyment arising from conscience, and his moral feelings. From a consideration of these capacities we deduce the following principle of virtue —

Those actions are virtuous which consist in the proper gratification of these his capacities of enjoyment.

We must not, however, confound interest with duty; for whatever principle makes a man's interest his duty is necessarily defective. (Barck.)

Schemes founded on the principle of virtue.

1. That of the Stoics, which has been adopted by Dr Samuel Clarke, the friend and companion of Newton. This scheme makes the principle of virtue to consist in acting according to nature. It is well expressed in the following words of the Latin poet.

*Hi mores, haec dum secta fuit, immota batoni
Serrare modum, finemque tenere, naturamque sequi,
Patriaeque impendere vitam, nec sibi sed toto
Genitum se ordine mundo.**

We must however keep this in view, that to follow nature is not to obey a single impulse, regard less of her other dictates. We do not follow nature when we give reins to the animal passions, when at the same time such indulgence is condemned by reason. Regard nature as a system, and violate not one of her dictates at the expense of the rest.

With this caution, "sequi naturam", may be regarded as a safe principle of virtue. These are the views of Butler in his immortal Analogy.

2. The next scheme is that founded on utility, of which Tucker and Paley are the masters. They consider the useful to consist of whatever is best for a man himself - for mankind in general - in all ages - referring not only to this life but to all eternity. The principle then is this. What is useful is right, because it is useful. There is much truth in this principle, but it is not altogether true, because duty, or moral obligation, does not always coincide with utility or interest. They are two lines ever running parallel, but duty is not always one and the same thing as interest.

3. The next is Holliston's scheme, which consists in making truth the principle of action.

5. The next scheme is that of Dr George Campbell, which
*I ask pardon of Lucan for spoiling the scanning.

makes a well regulated self love, the principle of virtue, and this principle differs but little from Payley's. Whatever is the best for the individual himself in the most extended sense, is the source of virtue.

5. Adam Smith, Author of the "Wealth of Nations", makes sympathy the principle of virtue. An individual can not see his own actions in their true light, but he has the power of transferring himself in another's stead, and of here judging of the virtue or vice of actions. He considers sympathy to be synonymous with conscience.

6. The next scheme is Hume's, who makes the sentiment of admiration, the principle of virtue. Moral actions awaken a feeling of admiration in the mind of the observer; but Hume was misled by the term virtue, applying it to all things which excite the sentiment of admiration. We sometimes admire the feats of the clown, or mountebank, and indeed a many other actions which surely cannot be said to be virtuous in themselves, but which are rather vicious, or at least indifferent.

7. The next is Edwards's scheme, which is founded on disinterested benevolence, or a love of universal being apportioned to each being according to his quantum of being, in respect of, and especially guarded against, self-love; and consequently he considers self-love, which he has not distinguished from selfishness, the root of all evil. The deity, as having the highest degree of the quantum of being, is the source of all virtue, and is entitled to supreme regard.

Moral evil detracts from the quantum of being, and hence Satan is entitled to no regard or esteem whatever.

In all these schemes there is much truth, but none of them are entirely free from error. Let us then attend to the inquiry what is virtue? We answer, that is that property of an action which the mind, in the direct exercise of its moral feelings pronounces to be in conformity with the nature and relations of the agent. Conscience acts as the judge, and gives decision, while Reason and Reflection make out the case, and when made out fairly, the judge

seldom errs. In this court of moral judicature, Reason and Reflection, especially when prompted by Self, play the part of dishonest lawyers, and then sometimes the judge gives a wrong decision. Edwards would have Self, delared the priviledges of the court, considering him as the author and prime mover of all evil. We next enquire,

Wherein consists the excellency of virtue?

The answers to this question will differ according to the different schemes of the principle of virtue, of various authors.

1. The first answer is this. Virtue is excellent, because it is according to the will of God. (Diamond)
2. Because it is according to the nature of things & reason. (Beauchamp)
- 3 Because it conduces to public interest. (Haley)
- 4 Because it conduces to private interest.

Let us return to a consideration of the first. This makes virtue excellent, independent of the nature of the thing itself, but simply because it is according to the will of God. The following distinctions will show how much truth there is in this position. An action may be wrong for two reasons, first because it is a malum prohibitum, and secondly because it is malum per se; or an action is what we call the moral natural, or the moral positive. The opposite of the moral natural, or what is wrong, is the malum per se, and the opposite of moral positive, or wrong, is the malum prohibitum. In other words, an action is right only because it is commanded, while on the other hand the moral natural is essentially right whether it has been commanded or not. It is extremely difficult to find an overt action, which might not become right, did God command it. God commanded Abraham to offer up his son Isaac, and who will deny but that the act would have been right, had Abraham obeyed the command? Not so, however, with an act of the mind. The deity himself, we speak it with reverence, could make ingratitude right - right for the creature to hate the beneficent creator. This principle, therefore, which makes the excellency of virtue dependant

entirely on the will of God, is here defective. It is true, however, in this sense; Looking into revelation and on the light of nature, we derive a knowledge of God's attributes; and from these we know that ^{whatever} the Deity does command, is morally right; for it is impossible to command that to be right which is inconsistent with his own nature. And hence the moral character of an action, which we call the moral natural, is right, not through virtue of any command, but because it is right essentially, independent of any other considerations.

2. The next doctrine, which ^{makes} virtue consist in reason and the nature of things, is held by Dr Clark and the Stoics, and with them we coincide. Virtue is to be preferred for its own sake, independent of any law or legislation on the subject; and if asked why this is so, we can only answer that it is consistent with reason, and the established order of things! Farther than this, we cannot go, for it is an ultimate fact of which no explanation nor reason can be given. 3. The next doctrine, embraced by Edwards, Paley and Tucker, makes the excellency of virtue consist in public interest. Paley, indeed, blends public with private interest, and makes virtue depend on utility in the most extensive and general acceptation of the term.

Remarks on the views of Paley and Tucker. It is true that in deciding what duty is, we must sometimes resort to expediency, or take into consideration the consequences; for it is most true, that no action, resulting from moral obligation, will in the long run, be attended with ~~evil~~ results, but always the reverse; But it is by no means true that what ^{seems} to our short sighted vision, seems to be to our interest, springs from virtuous action; or in other words, that the useful is necessarily the virtuous, because it is useful. This is shown by the following arguments. 1. All men have framed to themselves, the distinct ideas of ^{utility} pleasure and duty interest, as appears from their modes of speech.

Thus the Greeks distinguish the *ajabor* from *koros*; the Latins *utile*, from *honestum*; and we have distinct ideas of duty and interest.

2. The emotions of which we are conscious, on the contemplation of conduct, framed on the principle of a regard to interest, and those arising from a sense of right or duty, are entirely different. We have a greater regard for him who is virtuous from a love of virtue, than for him who does right from mercenary motives. We may have reason to doubt, ^{the purity of} that man's religion which is founded only on the fear of punishment, and the hopes of reward, without any love for its commands and ordinances. Pope thus expresses these views.

What conscience dictates to be done;

Or warns me not to do,

This teaches me more than hell to shun,

That more than heaven to pursue. (?)

3. Children are susceptible of moral emotions, arising from approbation or disapprobation, long before they can form any calculations about interest, or understand what it means. Palfy relates the story of a son, who to save his own life, betrayed his father into the hands of his enemies, and says that a savage or a child, cannot determine whether the son acted with ingratitude or not.

We contend that the dictates of interest alone cannot decide this question, and that either a child or savage would pronounce the son ^{un-}ingrate.

4. These theories of virtue which make it depend on utility, takes away its excellence, and place it on its tendency.

5 We conclude with this remark; The ground of preference, as well as of moral obligation is in the nature of virtue itself; but it must be strengthened by considerations of interest, although these are only secondary.

Question. Is virtue its own reward; and vice its own punishment.

We answer in the negative by the following arguments,
1 The hope of future rewards and punishments as a sentiment of piety, is not mercenary, since these rewards

consist in a state of perfect virtue. 2. The rule of virtue in the present state would be greatly diminished were the future left out of view. In the language of the apostle, "If we have no hope, then of all men are we the most miserable."

3. It is not always the most wicked who feel the most remorse; as it should be, if vice were its own reward: and it is on this assumption that Shaftesbury's argument depends. He reasons thus: The wicked man suffers for his crimes, in this world, by the pangs of conscience; and the virtuous man is rewarded by the pleasure always attending good actions. Hence both the bad and the good, having received their ^{reward} according to their works, it is unreasonable to expect a repetition of the same thing in the world to come. But the principle on which this argument is founded, is not correct. It is neither the hardened villain, nor the innocent man who suffers from remorse, but rather the tyro in crime. The finished villain becomes insensible to remorse, having his conscience seared as with a hot iron: and besides this, as he advances along the road of crime, he learns to justify himself by adopting and reasoning from false principles. The latter thinks there are thousands far more worse than himself; and this principle will be found operating throughout all classes and conditions in society.

4. Human virtue at best, is imperfect, and needs to be strengthened by considerations of interest. Under the government of a being wise and good, no man can be required to sacrifice entirely his interests; and it is absurd to suppose that any one, through mere love of virtue, should do his duty: hence there must be future rewards to encourage him to the discharge of this duty.

Division of Duty.

Our duties are twofold, — those that are subjective, and those that are objective.

1. Those that are ^{sub}jective proceed according to the principles from which these duties flow; Hence we have the cardinal virtues — Prudence, Temperance, Justice, Fortitude.

2. Those duties that are objective are such as we owe to God, our neighbor, (and ourselves) — We will take up the first class. — 1st Subjective duties — The ancients took these all in a more enlarged sense than we do, making, indeed, all our subjective duties to consist in them. Hence they included under one name virtues for which we have several names. Thus under Justice, was included mercy, benevolence, & sympathy. &c. —

Objective Duties. 1. Duty to God. It is here in place to prove the being of God; This is supported by three arguments; First, An argument derived a priori; Second, a posteriori; Third, from the common consent of all nations —

1. A priori. This is Newtons argument. "Time and space are necessary and unbanded; These are not substances, therefore they are attributes of a being eternal and omnipotent" —

2. A posteriori. This argument proves the existence of God from his works. But before we proceed farther we will mention the different kinds of belief on this subject, as indicated by the names of those classes which hold it, 1. The Antitheist who asserts that there is no God. Dr Chalmers says that he must be a fool who unequivocally ~~denies~~ denies the existence of a God; because it implies that he has been at every part of the universe, where a God might dwell. 2. The Atheist, who simply recognizes no God, not going to the same extent in his declaration as the Antitheist. 3. Polytheist, who believes in the existence of many Gods. 4. Pantheist, who believe that all the universe

taken together constitutes a God; The theist, monoth^{ist}, deist; these terms designate him who believes in the existence of one God only; and this is the point we are now going to prove.

1. There is either a first cause; or an infinite chain of second causes, each depending upon the preceding chain or series, the whole independent, self supportant and unconnected with a first chain: The theist takes the first position, but the pantheist, the last; which is perfectly absurd.

2 This ~~First~~ Cause is intelligent.

This is proven incontrovertibly throughout all nature, by marks of design. (For the nature of this proof. See The Discourse of Socrates with Anaxagoras; Xenophon's Memorabilia.) Marks of design; These are manifested: 1. By Adaptation; 2. Relation; 3. Analogies; 4. Prospective contrivances, and compensations. Instances. 1. Adaptation of the organized bodies to the laws of the material world. Eg. Adaptation of the organs of respiration, in plants and animals to the atmosphere; of the eye to light; size to the laws of gravitation; relation between the different masses of matter. 2. Adaptation of the inhabitants of the air, earth & water to their elements, and of particular species to their respective localities. Ex. Bird: fish, Camel, reindeer. 3. The relations of the vegetable, animal, and mineral kingdoms. ("All flesh is grass" is true, literally and metaphorically) 4. Adaptation of animals to animals. Some constituting food for others: the male for the female, by which the species is propagated. 5. The migratory instincts of animals. — Indly, Analogy:

The following are marks of design as exhibited by 1st. Analogies of comparative anatomy: 2nd Of vegetables and animals: 3rd Of the laws of the material world. Before we give any instances, we remark that when there is a departure from the ordinary laws of nature, it also exhibits design. It is a general law that bodies are expanded by heat; but to this water when freezing is an exception: and there is much wisdom in this, because if ice should

contract, it would become heavier and sink to the bottom; and thus rivers would become entirely frozen.

Instances. 1. The crystalline lens in a fish's eye is more convex than in the eye of a land animal; nor does the iris expand and contract; thus adapting it to the element in which it lives. 2. The bird's eye is provided with a bony hook which elongates the axes, and also with a string called marsupium to draw back the crystalline lens. Thus the bird is enabled to take a long and near sight. 3. The Gastric juice of the stomach, acts upon the meats placed in the stomach, but does not act upon the stomach itself. 4. We may here mention several functions of the body by which it sustains its vitality, as its Secretions, & Assimilation. The lungs dilate so as to receive from 42 to 100 cubic inches of air, and contract so as to expel it: an effect produced by the obliquity of the ribs, and partly by the diaphragm. Blood vessels lie near the surface of the skin, while arteries which would endanger ^{or not} life. — Provisious Instances. Birds are oviparous, otherwise gestation would impede the bird in its flight; The parent bird feeds each young one in its turn; she never lays more eggs than she can warm, and if these are taken from her nest, she will lay more. Birds of prey, as the eagle, lay but few eggs; while other birds as the partridge, lay a great number; the wisdom in this is obvious. In man, the male is to the female, ^{in no} as 12 to 12: and this provision of nature is to provide for the greater mortality in man than in woman. The young of all creatures are not brought ^{forth} till the season has prepared their appropriate food. There seems to be an exception in this in the case of domestic animals, where nature accommodates herself to circumstances. Animals are taught by instinct, and provided with appropriate instruments by nature to defend themselves against their enemies, and provide food. Ex. The elephant's trunk serves to feed him, and proves a most excellent weapon of defence, &c. Fishes tails are perpendicular, while birds are horizontal. There is a departure from this in warm blooded fish. The neck and legs of animals are commensurate except in water fowls.

According to some naturalists 800,000 animalcules exist in
 a space no larger than a grain of sand. The greenish
 color of the northern oceans is said to be owing to these animalcules.
 The sphericity of the earth, its axis being parallel to itself: obliquity
 of the axis in regard to the plane of its orbit: Configuration
 of the earth in regard to seas, rivers, hills, mountains, continents—
 all these exhibit manifest evidences of design. The erect
 posture of man, which enables him to carry his head and
 to see farther. The convenient position of the organs of the
 body—thus the nostrils act as a kind of sentinels over the mouth.
 The vital parts—heart—lungs—brain, arteries—are all placed
 in secure positions. Double organs—as ears, eyes: if one be-
 comes injured, its office may be supplied by the other. The
 excretories perform most important functions, as every day's
 experience will show. There are 600 muscles, according to Galen, re-
 quiring 10 conditions—thus making them in fact equal to 6000 re-
 quiring one condition.—Of bones 284, each requiring 40 conditions.
 Diversity of human features, voices, hand write: the design
 in these is manifest. The eye: we have no time to dwell on this,
 but remark that when this most wonderful piece of mechanism
 is examined, it will be found to exhibit the most unquestionable
 marks of design. In the teeth there are three things. 1 They are
 harder than bones: 2 They are without covering—3 There is a cavity
 in which an artery, nerve, & vein pass to each tooth. The front teeth,
 incisors, are placed before; the hard teeth, grinders, are placed behind
 near the point. The tongue—so necessary in articulation, in taste &c.
 The epiglottis: gullet has two tubes—one to the stomach, and one to the
 lungs. In articulation of the joints. — Metamorphoses of animals. Eg.
 caterpillars; mosquitoes; frogs—Muscles: which are adapted to
 every motion, and also an antagonistical muscle for a contrary
 motion—flexor—extensor. Muscles do not interfere in their action:
 their action is often wanted in places where they cannot be
 placed. Ex: the action of the toes is produced by muscles located
 in the calf of the leg. notice the sphincters, of the uses of which it
 is not here decent to speak. According to Nicotyle: 100 muscles
 are employed in every breath.

Some muscles act at a disadvantage in regard to power, but at a great advantage, as to celerity: which, indeed, is the kind of motion man most needs, as he can supply his deficiency in power by inventions in mechanics. Circulation of the blood: The bloodvessels are of two kinds: 1. The arteries, which are stronger than the veins, and which convey the blood from within outward: 2. The veins, which conduct the blood inward, to become oxidized by respiration. They both have valves inside to prevent regurgitation. The engine is the heart, which discharges through the aorta about a spoonful of blood at every beat: The mass of blood is about 25 lbs: 1 ounce is discharged at every pulsation: there are 80 pulsations per minute, or 4800 per hour; hence the whole mass must circulate once every 4 minutes, or about 14 times every hour. The aorta of the whale is one foot in diameter, and discharges 15 gallons of blood every pulsation of the heart. — The structure of man, shows 1st. an exact correspondence between the two sides; 2nd. an admirable package: 3. beauty: notice the difference between a skeleton and a well formed body: The faculty of standing: —

Comparative anatomy.

The object of this science is to compare the form and structure of different animals and thus reduce them to a common type. 1st. notice animals as to clothing: Ex. Bristles, hair, wool, fur, feathers, quills, prickles, scales, laminae. In the four first of these, there is a marked analogy; there is also much resemblance in the others. When there is any departure from the ordinary construction of any of these things, it is for the purpose of adapting the animal to the climate &c! Thus the wool of the sheep near the equator, becomes long like hair, while in more northern latitudes, it is thicker and finer. 2. As to the mouth: as in the analogy between the mouth of the dog, ox, man, sheep, elephant, sparrowhawk, snipe, woodpecker, duck. 3. The fibres of the gullet of animals, which from the proneness of their necks, must force their food upward, are disposed in two close spiral lines crossing each other, 4. The intestines in granivorous animals are long, but in

carnivorous animals they are short: the reason of this that in the case of the former longer time is required to reduce the food to a condition homogenous with the body, than in the latter. 5. Prospective contrivances. By this we understand those parts of the body which nature has formed for some subsequent use: Ex. 1. The first set of teeth of infants. 2 The milk in the lacteal system of mammiferous animals.

344. We here speak in metaphors. The eyes are formed in a dungeon, and the lungs at the bottom of the sea. 3 Relation. Ex. Relation of the parts of animals which serve the purposes of preserving existence, as, mastication, deglutition, assimilation, circulation, nutrition. These functions are intimately connected together, ~~the~~ every one preparing the way for the succeeding one. 2. The relation of the kidney and ureters. 3. Of the parts of different bodies. 4. The mole, its ~~snout~~, eyes, form, scrapers. - 6. Compensation. Sometimes a departure from the general laws of formation makes a want; in such cases this want is compensated by some other advantage. 1 Thus the short neck of the elephant is a departure from the law of the commonness of the neck and legs of animals, but this loss is supplied by his long trunk. 2 The hook of a bat wing. This animal has not the power of springing like birds from the ground, but this loss is compensated by its power of catching by these hooks and; dropping from the object to which it clings. 3 The spider, which lives on insects, and has not wings, has the power of constructing webs: it is remarkably sharp-sighted, having eight eyes. Some insects, which have their eyes fixed, but multangular. 4. In the alpeccas or sea-fox, the shortness of his gut is compensated by a spiral passage. 5 Lobsters cast their shells yearly; and in the space of 48 hours grow a new shell at the same time being formed. 6. Some quadrupeds want the upper teeth; this loss is compensated by the power of rumination, as in the cow, deer, &c. There is something analogous to this in birds, which have a gizzard, which in some measure supplies the want of teeth. This is not needed in birds of prey which live on flesh.

7. The want of legs on serpents is compensated, in part, by annular rings, and by the power of moving on a serpentine course. — These are but few of the innumerable instances with which nature abounds, of the marks of design; and they must prove to every rational mind, the intelligence of that Being whom we call God.

Attributes of God.

We can arrive at a knowledge of the attributes of God by the method pursued by the Schoolmen, which is as follows.

There are three ways of learning these attributes. 1. *Via causalitatis*. 2. *Via eminentiae*, 3. *Via negationis*.

1. *Via causalitatis*. Whatever is found in the effect, must have been in the cause, and hence all excellencies in the creation must be in the Creator.

2. *Via eminentiae*. All excellency in the creature must exist in the highest degree in the Creator.

3. *Via negationis*. Whatever imperfections are in the creature, must be removed from the Creator. It is in these ways that every man derives a knowledge of God's attributes, and the more he advances in his knowledge of nature, the more perfect will be his comprehension of them. His attributes are divided into three classes, Natural, moral, and intermediate. 1. Natural attributes. We can conceive these to exist independent of his moral nature. They are necessary existence, or independence, eternity, aliquity or immensity, spirituality, knowledge, omnipotence.

2. Moral attributes. We can have no conception of these connected with moral excellence. They are; Holiness, justice, truth, goodness, mercy.

3. Intermediate attribute. This is wisdom, which partakes of both the former. We will now briefly review these attributes.

1. Necessary existence. The belief of this in God thrusts itself upon; we can form no conception of his character unless this enters as an ingredient. What is necessary must be independent, and consequently eternal. In eternity note 1. Eternity a *parte ante*; 2 Eternity a *parte post*. This is comprehended

in the formula, "From everlasting to everlasting, thou art God", more properly, "From eternity to eternity thou art God".

3. The next natural attribute is alquity or immensity; it refers to his power of filling at the same moment of time space without limit—extension, which in the language of the Schoolmen has its Centre everywhere, its circumference nowhere. *Am grand* is the idea of a being for whom there is no part of space so vast, no point so small, but what his presence may fill.

Now is the language of the Psalmist, when expressing this same idea; "Whither shall I go from thy Spirit, or whither shall I flee from thy presence? If I ascend up into heaven, thou art there: if I make my bed in hell, behold, thou art there: If I take the wings of the morning, and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea, even there shall thy hand lead me, and thy right hand shall hold me."

4. Spirituality. We know nothing of the essence of either spirit or matter. We can only form an idea of the spiritual by divesting it of material properties: and although thus intangible, in our ideas at least, we can give it a local habitation and a name.

5. Knowledge. The knowledge of God is infinite, and extends to all things actual and possible, past, present & future, and ~~possible~~. The knowledge of God differs from that of man in intensity, and in knowing the essence of things.

6. Omnipotence means the ^{power} performing all things practicable, and is not limited except by an absurdity; as, for example, to cause a thing to be, and not to be, at the same time.

2. Moral Attributes. 1. Holiness. Many writers have found a difficulty in explaining this attribute. Passing by various definitions, it may be briefly expressed as that attribute in the nature of God, by which he vindicates his own honor and right. It corresponds to what we call a sense of honor in man, and which leads him to maintain his honor and dignity. 2. Justice. This attribute has two functions or spheres of operation, according to which it is denominated as 1st Commutative, & 2nd as retributive.

The first is employed in the adjustment of questions of right when individuals are the claimants, as in civil cases.

The second species of justice, also called vindictive or retributive, is exercised when the ruling power is a party, as in criminal cases, where the government has the power of avenging the injured party. A question here arises in morals, which has been considered for centuries as a point of much difficulty.

~~Does it belong to the nature of justice to punish crime for its~~
own sake? irrespective of all consequences, as the reformation of the offender, and as an example to others. —

If to reform is the object, let it be called disciplinary. If to deter others from crime, exemplary. Besides these two ends is there something in crime which per se requires punishment? It is the opinion of Birkerspoon, Johnston and others, with whom we agree, that there is; while the contrary opinion is held by those who favor the abolition of capital punishment, and whose opinions are attended ^{to} with universalism. If crime is committed in secret, there is no need of a public example; and if the evil does is incorrigible, there is no need of punishment for reformation, and certainly it would be a great consolation to the wicked wretch to believe that he ~~would~~ receive no punishment simply because he is the most hardened sinner in the world. 3. Truth. (This, although it adds to the glory of God's attributes, yet is ~~not~~ a necessary attribute, for why should a Being omnipotent and omniscient, wish to deceive?) 4. Goodness, is that attribute which leads the Creator to bestow happiness on his creatures. 5. Mercy, as distinguished from goodness, consists in kindness shown to the miserable and underserving, and hence is a sovereign attribute. In the language of Shakspeare:

'Tis mightiest in the mightiest; It becomes
The throned monarch better than his crown:
His sceptre shows the force of temporal power,
The attribute to awe and majesty,
Wherein doth sit the fear and dread of kings;
But mercy is above this sceptred sway

It is enthroned in the heart of Kings,

It is an attribute to God himself.

This has not its foundation in Reason, as the other attributes of God, except in a vague and unsatisfactory manner; and hence, ^{we} cannot be sure, independent of Divine Revelation, that God will exercise mercy towards his creatures. The ideas we can derive of from the light of Reason are 1. From the fact that we are conscious of the emotions of moral excellence in the exercise of it ourselves; 2 From the course of Providence. If all Transgressors were instantly punished, all evidence of mercy would be removed: yet this is not satisfactory, for what evidence have ^{we} independent of his word, that his present indulgence is ~~not~~ but a show of mercy, to be repaid with interest, in futurity?

3 Intermediate. 1. The Wisdom of God, implies Knowledge, but differs from Knowledge ~~that~~ in this, that it is active while the latter is contemplative, and also as being the attribute by which God discovers the best ends and the means of their accomplishment. As an attribute it is intermediate, because partaking both of the natural and the moral and belonging exclusively to neither. It is natural because referring to his power to know: it is moral because referring to the adaptation of means to ends, which from his nature, must always be moral and hence good. — To all these attributes there is no objection except to goodness.

This objection is drawn from the fact that evil, natural and moral, exists in the world. This cannot arise from a want of power, for all nature proves his omnipotence; it must hence arise from a want of will — or goodness. This is the argument of some, and several theories have been invented to account for it. The first is, the hypothesis of a state of previous existence, but this removes the objection but one step, because we may inquire, why was evil permitted in a previous state. The second is the doctrine of Manichæism, or theory of two principles, derived from Zoroaster,

This doctrine supposes two independent beings, a good and an evil, the former of whom is the author of all good in the world, and the latter of all evil.

3 The next theory is that of Optimism, of which there are two modifications. 1 That of those who, denying free agency, and reducing everything to the law of physical necessity, maintain that there is in the very nature of things an invincible necessity that a certain quantum of evil should exist in order to the production of the greatest quantity of good in the whole. This is to cut the knot, not to solve it. —

2. That of those, who, allowing to man free agency, and ascribing to the government of the world a firm basis in the establishment of general laws, account for moral evil by man's abuse of the first, and for natural evil by his violation of the second. This in substance we adopt, and to make it intelligible, it may be expanded into the following remarks. 1st. It was plainly the design of God that there should be such a thing as virtue; which, however, supposes free agency in man; but free agency is liable to err, and has erred, and hence the introduction of evil.

2nd. The greater part of the evils actually found in the world, men bring upon themselves, and inflict upon ^{others} ~~one another~~.

3rd. Difficulty, pain, opposition there must be in a theatre constructed for the exhibition of fortitude, courage, patience, self-denial and such like virtues.

4th. The power of Contrast has great power of heightening every enjoyment; and hence there must be evil to contrast with good.

5th. Is there not more pleasure in the pursuit than in the enjoyment, and this pleasure is enhanced by opposition.

Most unhappy are they who left without any interest arising from rational enjoyments are forced to resort to the excitement of the cup and of the gaming table. Pleasures are enhanced by danger and scenes of bloodshed and carnage.

6th. Pains are the satellites which guard life: They are the indices of disease, and call aloud for remedies.

7th There is a pliability in the human constitution, which

by the power of habit, things in themselves disagreeable are rendered less so, but are often transformed into pleasures; hence persons are never so miserable as to strangers they may appear to be; and hence, also, few would exchange their own condition with another.

Nature has attributed pleasurable sensations to the exercise of all our senses, so that our capacities for pleasure are just as numerous as our powers and faculties.

Now the designs and purposes of God might have been answered without this gratuitous donation of pleasure, and hence it affords strong evidences of goodness.

8. Whatever instances we find in nature, in opposition to this general appearance of goodness in the creator, we ought to attribute to our own ignorance of his designs. How much more rational is it, when nature abounds with such numerous marks of goodness, to believe in universal benevolence rather than in a being who in the cup of blessings, mingles up the drugs of misery. — But look at the mortality and pain of the human family! True; but it was evidently the design of nature that happiness should be diffusive — and hence one generation, having enjoyed all this world can give, must make way for another who are entitled to the same enjoyments. But says the objector, animals prey on one another. Some naturalist says, the great law of nature is, "eat, or be eaten." Moreover, animals destroyed thus die easier than in the natural way. But after all our wisdom and ingenuity is displayed in removing objections to the goodness of God, yet there are some cases which seem to show the designs of an evil being; but it is the part of wisdom to refer these to our ignorance of the ways of Him "whose ways are past finding out."

Suppose it should have pleased the Creator to have created man with only a single capacity, and that for pleasure; and again suppose the Creature to have been endowed with three capacities, two for pleasure, and one for pain. The capacity for pain will neutralize one for pleasure; and in both

cases man would be endued with an equal amount of happiness. How surely one affords as certain marks of goodness in the Creator as the other: and we can account for the intermixture of evil with good by supposing God had some great objects to accomplish.

What kind of Government does the Deity exercise over man? It is first necessary to examine the different theories of philosophers to account for government of mind over matter.

- 1st That of the Materialist, according to which all the phenomena, subject to our observation, whether of mind or matter, are the results of the inherent, essential, active powers ^{properties} of matter.
- 2nd That they are the result of certain active properties communicated, not essential, to matter.
3. That ascribing them to certain general laws.
4. (Cudworth). That ascribing them to a plastic nature.
5. (Kepler). That which ascribes them to so many different minds.
6. That which makes the material universe the machine, constructed and put in motion by the fiat of the Almighty Architect, and continuing to move according to the impulse given to it.
- 7th That which supposes a Divine Power constantly exerted throughout all nature, superintending and directing all things by a minute inspection and perpetual interference. There may be some truth in all these doctrines or theories.

There are two extremes, in regard to which, "medicilis tutissimus". 1st That of supposing, as some do, that Providence acts toward them the part of a familiar spirit. Let a man beware, says a profound thinker, how he considers himself the pet lamb of the Almighty. — 2nd That of those who neither recognize the hand of Providence in any thing, nor consider his interference by any means as being credible. This was the error of Epicurus and his sect, and which some, unjustly I think, have charged with Atheism. — It is here necessary to observe the nature of

Moral Government

under which we believe man to be placed. Its nature is such that free agents are the subjects, and it is carried on by rewards and punishments. Now that man is under such government is proved, 1st From our moral sentiments or judgements. 2nd From the course of events; though this is obscure, because the moral government of God here is not fully developed. Note: So far as the moral government of God is developed, it is that which we mean by Providence. One more topic -

The Divine Right to Govern.

This right, in general, is founded on three pillars - Goodness, Wisdom, and Power. Goodness to design the best - Wisdom to see the best - and Power to execute the best. What right have Folly and Malignity to rule! To this foundation must be added Creation, for as the Universe is the result of the Almighty Power, nothing is more reasonable than that He should govern it.

Application of these principles to the division of Duty. The Duties we owe to God are internal and external.

1. Internal duties are so called because they are mental acts. There are three - Love, fear and trust, and the union of them constituted piety. Love has been distinguished into esteem, gratitude, benevolence and desire.

2. Fear is distinguished into 1. filial and 2. senile. The 1st only implies moral excellence: the 2nd is exercised by the bad as well as the good.

3rd Trust. This is the faith of the scriptures, when joined with the principle of obedience. It is tried in affliction and here generates submission and hope.

2. External Duties. By this is meant all proper ways of manifesting these internal sentiments, as prayer, songs of praise &c. Here let us consider two objections. 1st Against the propriety of worship, which is thus stated. It is derogatory to the dignity of a good man to delight in hearing his own praises: much more, therefore, to the Deity, whose holiness is superior to man's. Answer,

When the expressions of reverence and respect are due from one man to another there is nothing mean in the latter exacting it: may there is something dishonorable on his conduct if he do not. Again: The duty must be regarded on his official character as supreme ruler: Moreover, the Supreme Ruler requires it, not as gratifying to himself, but as being proper for us to bestow. - The second objection is not made against the propriety, but against the efficacy of worship. It is thus reasoned: The Supreme Being must govern according to an established plan, by which the order of events is fixed. Is it reasonable then to suppose that He would change this order at the solicitation of a weak, insignificant mortal? If it is in order, the blessing will come without our solicitation, and if not, how can our prayers accomplish it? This doctrine, employed by the Stoics, was called *ignari ratio*. It is not necessary to answer an argument so fallacious.

Answer. Reason assures us that there may be, and scripture assures us that there is, an efficacy in subordinate causes, and as the Almighty Ruler governs the universe by these, we know that the ends with which they are connected are not to be expected without them. Again. The efficacy of prayer, as a means, may be in this, that it affects a change in the supplicant; and prepares him to receive the blessing desired. It affects not a change in God, nor the order of His plans of Providence. The petitioner brings himself within the sphere of Almighty beneficence, as in a boat, connected to the shore by means of a rope, we pull not the shore to us, but ourselves to it. -

Sept 30th 1840. Thus ends the labors of the Junior Year.

Nov. 3^d 1846.Our Duties to Others.

The duties we owe to others may be arranged under two heads 1. Justice. 2. Benevolence. Of these two duties, justice is the more indispensable, inasmuch as we should never be ^{benighted} ~~just~~ at the expense of justice. We make a few remarks on these two duties.

1. Justice. The principal duties under this head are negative, and require to abstain from inflicting injuries. In order to understand this prohibition let us consider the nature of injury.

Injuries may be inflicted in the following seven ways.
(1) 1. To individuals, in their persons or bodies, as in the infliction of a bodily wound. The highest injury that man can inflict on man, is death; and it is worthy the attention of the moral philosopher that nature has coupled with the commission of such crimes as these a remarkable punishment, reaching to the perpetrator and even in some respect, to those who behold the deed. The murderer is haunted with the image of his victim; and community is aroused to the highest pitch of indignation, which uniting with feelings of personal interest and security, demand immediate punishment on the head of the criminal. This affords an easy solution of that illegal procedure, Lynch Law. — A question here arises in morals.

How far may he be considered guilty of murder who destroys life according to consent or desire of the individual who loses it? There is a maxim in law, — volenti non fit injuria, to which we cannot give our assent. There is some truth in this, but it is not all true; it may serve the purposes of the lawyer very well, but in a wide view of moral obligation it will not hold. Is there no injury inflicted, or is it right, because the drunkard desires it to sell him a poison which will surely ~~and~~ inevitably destroy his life. In this case, to say the least of it, it would be but the consent of two persons to commit deliberate murder, and because one is the subject, it cannot absolve the other.

(2) 2^d. Injuries to character. The slanderer inflicts the highest injury, at least to sensitive minds. "He who steals my purse, steals trash: 'twas mine — 'tis his, and has ^{made} ~~been~~ the slave

thousands: but he who robs me of my good name filches that which enriches him not, and makes me poor indeed." Slander proceeds from some malignant passion, mostly envy, and then is called detraction. It also sometimes arises from a settled malicious purpose and paves the way for future injuries. Thus: a man's reputation is his defence: destroy this and you destroy coat of mail that defends his life from the slanderer's dart. This is well illustrated by a homely proverb. "You kill a dog when you take away his character for honesty."

The vindication made by the slanderer that he speaks the truth is no exculpation. It is a common but mistaken notion, that "the truth is no slander." Now a man's character may be injured in two ways: first, by a suppression veri, and secondly, by a sug-
gestion falsi, and of the ~~first~~ former is certainly the most criminal and even contemptible. He who slanders by telling the truth, but not the whole truth, gives a false coloring to the action, and whilst pretending a scrupulous regard to truth is guilty of the most abominable lies. Further: Suppose no suppression of truth, yet a man has no right to give publicity to the misdeeds of another. Suppose his general tenor of life to be adorned with virtues: shall he, for one misdeed, lose that which is as valuable to himself as life? Hence we derive the common maxim, "never speak ill of another."

Exceptions. 1. Sometimes the public good requires that that knavery should be exposed, and misdeeds be brought to light.

2. When an individual is secretly plotting against an innocent person, justice requires that it should be revealed.

3. Suppose the deed evil - yet the author may have repented, and charity requires that he should not be exposed. -

We remark in general, most injuries perpetrated in social life either begin with calumny or end with it.

"Proprium est humani generis disse quem laeseris." Tacitus. Finally: the conduct of some who refuse to give testimony in order to shield themselves from both parties, sometimes amounts to slander. Of this you will find many instances.

(From 8. J. W.). 3^d In his belief. In the case where calumny is employed, he that is calumniated is injured and also he to whom these slanderous reports are communicated, in being made to believe a falsehood. There are also other cases in which a man may be injured in his belief. He who has a falsehood of any kind imposed upon him, whether this falsehood is slanderous to others or not, is injured in belief. It is natural in men to speak the truth, and it is also natural to believe what is told them for the truth. A lie is generally told either to conceal some crime committed or intended to be committed. There are different kinds or grades of lies. The definition of a lie is a "willful falsehood". A simple falsehood is not always a lie. A person may very innocently tell a falsehood; it must be told with an intention to deceive, in order to constitute a lie. The repetition of floating rumors, without knowing or caring whether they be true or false, amounts almost to a lie. The first kind is what is called malicious lying; i.e., a known falsehood told to injure others. 2nd Interested lies. A vendor praises excessively his goods, intimating that he gave more for them than he really did. 3rd Officious lies, vulgarly called ^{white} ~~false~~ lies; ex. such as are told by physicians to conceal the state of the patient from him. Pious frauds come under this head. 4th Jocular lies. This consists in the practice of telling "garns" or improbable stories for fun and mirth. This however is ~~not~~ properly criminal since the essence of a lie consists in the intention to deceive. By this standard we are to judge whether the following are lies or not. 1. Equivocation, or the use of an ambiguous word, having two meanings in one of which it may be true and in the other not.

Now if the person employing it knows that it will be taken in its untrue sense, it is a lie.

2^d Evasion. This an answer to an inquiry which although literally true, is not the truth of the answer, or that

which the enquirer expects. If @ one to deceive, it is a lie.

3rd Irony. This is merely a figure of speech: the lie does not depend upon the language employed, but the idea conveyed, and hence it wants the essence of a lie-reception. 4th Hyperbole. This is an admitted figure in speech, used even in the Bible, and is not intended to deceive. 5th Forms of ceremony whether in speech or action.

In letters, the form, "I am your most obedient servant, Yours to command" &c. as there is no attempt at deception, but only a conformity to the customs of politeness, it does not constitute a lie. — A question here arises, Is it right, in any case, to violate the truth, or tell a lie? As before observed, remember that the essence of a lie consists in deception: in order fully to answer this question, a still farther distinction must be made.

If a man professes to tell the truth, while it is a lie, he is inexcusable. But where no profession is made to speak the truth, signs may be made, by which one may be deceived, the person himself knowing that he will be misunderstood.

The rule is, when there is a profession made to declare the truth, the strictest rule of veracity prevails, and any departure from this is highly criminal. Those who found virtue on utility are under the necessity of justifying a lie: Thus for example;

When some great advantages will result from the lie sufficient to justify the commission on consideration of the countervailing general advantages. The doctrine of Paley is that a man may lie in order to save his own life: or an individual influenced by the threats of a robber to permit a large reward for his liberation, is under no obligation to keep that promise. I cannot agree to any doctrine that invalidates the bonds of moral obligation: Admit the person may be under no obligation to the robber, yet he is under obligations to himself.

Nor is it right to determine the morality of an adherence to truth by the probable consequences that may result from so doing, for this would be to resolve a lie into expediency. If in any case there is a palliation for a

departure from the truth, it must come under the rights of necessity which we shall have occasion hereafter to notice. Now shall the following case be disposed of? A man on a high tower is in the power of a madman who threatens to throw him down: the man promises to go down and jump up, and thus preserved his life. Was this deception justifiable? The Lectures supposes it to be on the grounds that the madman was in the state of irrational animals to which the rules of moral obligation do not apply. — We here notice two other topics. 1. Veracity is made a point of honor among men is chastity among women. When veracity is violated, especially when considered as a point of honor, it is a strong evidence of a feeble character, and as such subjects the individual to contempt. Whatever moral force he has, it is expected he will employ to defend this, the citadel of his honor; when this is taken, all is lost. How withering the scorn and how unrelenting the contempt that clings to the erring female who on losing her chastity has lost her all! — John Randolphs maxim is — Be honorable for honors sake — tell the truth for truths sake. For example: Suppose a secret is entrusted to you which you promise not to divulge: You are interrogated in regard to it: Randolph says, give a flat denial, otherwise your silence will betray the secret and you will be guilty of falsehood. We believe that the more honorable and manly course is to reply like John Quincy Adams under similar circumstances, "On this subject I will not be interrogated".

2^d. The Doctrine of signs. Signs are natural, and arbitrary or conventional. Natural signs are those that have a resemblance to the thing signified or are connected with it in nature. A picture is an example of the first, and smoke of the latter. Arbitrary signs are those established by agreement between the different parties. Ex. A piece of red cloth may be considered as the sign of dinner. Customary signs are those established by common consent: of this kind are languages, where the meaning of words depends on common agreement. Now we say that the doctrine

of veracity holds good in regard to all these signs, and a designed deception arising from their use is a violation veracity. On this ground we condemn the Jesuitical custom of mental reservation which consists in proclaiming an untruth aloud but mentally correcting it - A mental negation cannot justify a verbal declaration, because words are the signs of ideas, and as such produce deception in the minds of others. -

4) 1th. Man may be injured in his affections. This mode of injury is called seduction, and the victim of it is always a person related to another by natural ties, or by the obligations of friendship. Thus a child may be alienated, in its affections, from the parent - the wife from the husband or a friend from a friend, by the insidious arts of the seducer. Instances are more rare and indeed more atrocious of the parent being induced to desert the child, or the husband the wife, and this is a wise provision in nature since it brings a greater moral force to the protection of the weak. - Perhaps there is no violation of moral obligation so revolting to every sense of justice between man and man, as that of seduction. A man, ^{who} is received with confidence into a family - and he is treated as a member of the domestic circle, availing himself of this opportunity, and winning the affections of the wife of his friend, whom he seduces to her utter ruin - a ruin that brings with it disgrace that can never be effaced and a humiliating sense of moral degradation, never to be removed, and who by the same act of villainy inflicts on the entire family a wound never to be healed, is an unprincipled villain, for whose conduct we cannot find the least palliation. And not only so because the deed itself is a crime of the darkest hue; but his conduct is rendered cowardly as well as criminal because no human laws afford redress, or at least the injured party will seldom avail himself of that justice afforded by the laws which exposes him to the ridicule of the licentious, and the sneers of the unfeeling.

5 Next observe, man may be injured in his virtues. The ~~man~~ who corrupts the morals of another by flattery or any other art, leading the innocent from the paths of virtue, inflicts an injury that no words can describe. He must be lost to the nobler traits in human character who, practised in villainy and callous to every emotion of pity, misleads the young and inexperienced, initiating them into crime, stamping on the moral character an impress not to effaced, and which extends not alone to this life but connects itself with the eternal interests of these victims of his iniquity. The author of a bad book, calculated to taint the mind of the reading public, stands preeminent among those who are guilty of these crimes, and the more so as the productions of his pen, are so adorned and polished as to conceal the malignity of the poison lurking within them. Some French novelists, whose names are unworthy of notice, have transcended all the world has ever known, in this respect.

6 The next species of injustice is injury to his sensibilities. This in common parlance is called "hurting ones feelings," and the injury, rudeness ill-manners or impoliteness. It always proceeds from a want of common sense, taking the term in its proper meaning as denoting a regard for the feelings and interests of others. It is a duty we owe in social life to know so much of human nature and our own nature as will lead us to avoid injuring the sensibilities of those with whom we may have intercourse. This duty is well expressed by the French word etiquette, a diminutive from ethos, which denotes as regard to morality in small things. Any departure from a gentlemanly course of conduct carries with it an injury of this sort. There is a species of this vice which prevails to some extent in our country, and which is indicated by a rude

bristling offensive manner, a swaggering gait and a look that carries with it insult. The individual considers that he is born in a free country, and of course is at perfect liberty to offend every man he may chance to meet. Such a character may have admirers, but every man of refinement will certainly avoid him. Further; observe, a gentleman will always shun whatever may wound the sensibilities of the fair sex, for leaving out of view other considerations, their unprotected condition requires this. — Some one has said, you should never speak of rope in the presence of him whose ancestor has been hung. Perhaps this is pushing the rules of etiquette too far, yet it depends upon a principle of politeness which is well worthy of regard. Nothing should be adverted to in company that may, by the association of ideas, call up unpleasant emotions in the minds of any of those present.

(7) 7. Finally: Injury by a judicial sentence. It is certainly a species of injustice of no ordinary character and extremely aggravating to ^{the} feelings, when an individual applies to the courts of justice for redress of grievances, to have that justice denied him; and not only this, but to experience all the disappointment and expense attending a long lawsuit. A similar kind of injustice is common in arbitration where the parties are of opposite characters — the one gentle and peaceable — the other boisterous and unruly. A fear of consequences, and not justice, sometimes induces the arbitrators to make concessions to the latter which the true merits of the point at issue forbid. There is a similar species of injustice arising from a relaxed, partial system of civil discipline, that operates to the disadvantage of the meek, quiet and uncomplaining citizen who prefers to suffer injury than apply for redress. — There is another class of injuries which are more subtle and spiritual in their nature — the opposites of which are seldom found among men. I mean that species of injustice which, in relation to matters of property is called dishonesty. The criminality

of such actions depends upon the fact that what is ~~gained~~ by one, is taken from the other. To use a familiar illustration: A horse jockey who has bought a horse for less than its value says, "I have made a good bargain. If the truth were told you have made a bad one, because taking advantage of the other you have taken a part of his own property, and besides the ~~the immoral influence on community~~ ^{by means of example}, your moral responsibilities ^{are} blunted and weakened by the transaction. To this however, there is one exception. A owns a horse which is of no service to himself but extremely useful to B. B also owns a horse that would be serviceable to A. An exchange in this case would certainly be no robbery, but prove of great advantage to both. —

Candor: The exercise of candor which is conversant with things not material, but of the mind, is a species of honesty seldom known. Too frequently a desire for victory and not a love of truth, prevails in controversies, leading to misrepresentation, false quotations, sophistry and every unfair means ⁱⁿ argument which may avail in conquering the opposing party. In a word truth, candor, everything is sacrificed through a contemptible desire of victory. There is but one instance known to me of a fair and candid controversy — that between John Locke and Bishop Stillingfleet, in which both parties gained for themselves immortal honor. —

Injustice to the public. Injustice to individual will prove in most cases equally so to community. Besides this there are various other ways by which the public may be injured, as, by persons aspiring to offices for which they are totally incompetent, or by acting unfaithfully in the discharge of the duties of these offices. The next class of duties we owe to our fellow men fall under the general head of

2. Benevolence