

Moral Philosophy

Lecture II. Moral Philosophy is that science which treats of the principles and rules of moral obligation, moral science or moral legislation. Here a most important question meets us: whence are these principles and rules to be deduced? See Witherspoons introduction to moral philosophy. I will here give you the substance of it. The common answer would be, from the Bible, but there are some who do not believe divine revelation. We must start then, from some common point agreed upon by believers & those who do not believe. Is it safe, or fair so to do? A good many professors of Christianity say it is not. We know that the discoveries that have been made in later times for instance natural philosophy, have thrown great light upon the scriptures. And he answers, truly, that those who do not believe in the bible have their different ways of thinking and that this would oblige us to meet them on their own ground. but I would answer further it is ridiculous, to raise an objection of this kind which tends to trammel the human mind. It would,

considered rather a strange philosophy, to say that because a man can see better with a telescope than with the naked eye, that he should for this reason put out his eye, the same holds with a person who should lay aside reason and attempt to study the Bible.

Laying divine religion aside, we intend to investigate the subject without referring to it, or if we do it will not be as an authority. Since then we do not go to the bible on this subject, the same question recurs again: where is this to be found? The answer is that these rules & principles must be deduced from the nature of man. This supposes that the enquirer is not an atheist. I would go so far with the atheist as this

My next remark is that this is a very intricate & difficult (subject) study, (that of human nature) though it is highly important. We come now to the characteristic properties of human nature & in the first place, a vast number of considerations must be brought into view before deciding. What makes a man? what is his differentia & in what does he differ

Lecture

from the brute? The first that has been fixed upon is the majesty of the human countenance. Second, his superior organization. This is so proved that some philosophers have ascribed his superiority to that alone. Third, faculties of reason, speech, memory, foresight, conscience, taste, a sense of the ridiculous, sense of religion, these have all been fixed upon by philosophers - some placing more & some less stress upon them. I distinguish between reason & reasoning - man only is endowed with the former, brutes with the latter. Reason is that by which we know past rules in morals & in the common concerns of life - very often denominated common sense, which some one has greatly remarked is the best kind of sense. But reasoning begins where reason ends - reason is fixed, reasoning is not. How immense is the communication of man, when compared to that of the inferior animals! about as much in reason as in the other. Memory comes next. In this man's superiority is not so great as in the others. Foresight is the result of reasoning in man of instinct in animals.

or more properly speaking I should say they have no foresight. Conscience which animals are not possessed of, is intimately associated with reason; nor do I think they have any taste - The last mentioned is a sense of Religion, which the brutes have not. But the fourth difference or characteristic of human nature as distinguished from brutes is that in man's nature reason & Conscience are the ruling principles. In the nature of animals there is no ruling motive. Instinct is perfect at first & uniform - reason is not. It knows not why it acts - reason does. The immense superiority of man is seen in his susceptibility to indefinite improvement.

Unity of
the
race -

Lecture III. The next point is the unity of the race. Those in favour of the unity of the ^{human} race say, that climate & way of living are sufficient to account for all the difference which we see at present in the varieties of the human species. Blumharts make fine different species in which Maltetrum & all other geographers agree. The first of these is the

Caucassian who occupy westward Asia North
& East Africa Hindostan and Europe & we
may say North & South America. The colour of this
class is ruddy, their hair long, brown or fair, or
auburn, their heads are spherical face oval
forehead high & smooth, nose arched, or aquiline
mouth small, lips parting, chin full & round &
generally most regular & beautiful features. I would
add, that a line drawn horizontally, passing through
the pupil of the eye would divide it equally. The
most remarkable from these are the Chinese whose
eyes are

The second class are the Tartars or Mongolian
race, who inhabit the eastern part Asia. They are
of a yellow colour, their hair is black, stiff
straight & thin, their heads are square & ^{their} faces
are large, flat depressed - nose small & flat and
cheek bones prominent & the opening between the
eye lids narrow & oblique - chin pointed. --

Third class, is the native American who inhabit
this continent. They are of a copper colour - hair
black, straight & coarse - high cheek bones & sun-
ken eyes - face large -

The fourth class are the Malays or Australians

who inhabit Oceania. They are of a nut brown
colour - with black eyes - black curly hair
which is soft and abundant - a broad mouth
& nose & the upper jaw somewhat projecting.
The fifth is the negro or ^{African} African race
inhabiting East and South Africa & the coast
of Madagascar & the torrid zone except in
America. They are of a black colour - black eyes
black woolly hair - flat noses - thick lips
and a projecting upper jaw - crooked legs -
(Note: The American seems to be a shade

between the European & the Caucasian or
Tartar - the Malay, between the ^{European} American
& Africans; so that the varieties may be
reduced to three viz, the European & the
Caucasian & the Tartar or Mongolian or Asiatic
& the negro or Africa - Linnaeus, Buffon
Helvetius & Monroddo think that man
is derived from the monkey. Darwin, the
celebrated author of Zoonomia says he was
an aquatic animal like the oyster & that
his limbs were formed by exercise.

We have considered him in his individual
nature as a species. The first remark is,
that he has a compound nature of soul

Individual
Nature

& body. Our concern
is the first thing to be considered about it is its
spirituality or immateriality. Contradictory powers
properties cannot exist in the same substance
but volition, thought & solidity, vis inertiae are con-
tradictory powers properties; therefore these two prop-
erties exist in the same ^{subject} substance substance.
In other words body cannot have a self-moving
power which the mind has. therefore not the same.
This argument appears at first view solid yet
there are objections. —

Lecture III.

When seeds are planted the radical shoots
downwards & another corresponding substance is
protruded in an opposite direction. Some have
supposed that animals & vegetables have an
immaterial soul & that the phenomenon may
be accounted for by matter upon matter. There
are still many mysteries in nature.

But secondly, after all that has been said
about the instincts of animals & vegetables
what a wide difference is there between
these phenomena & the operations of reason
in man, which cannot be accounted for

either by the laws of matter or matter -
To say the least that can be said, how the
action of particles of matter upon matter
is inconceivable. Second objection, the soul
seems to grow & decline with the body. A
human being seems to pass through all the
stages of an animal & vegetable before he
arrives at the rational - His body (says Aris-
totle) arrives at maturity at the age of twenty -
his mind, at the age of forty-nine, after
which it declines. This is the doctrine of material-
ists. I must admit, that there is some force in
this; but to show that it is not decisive, I
answer, that there ^{are} exceptions to the general
truth as respects both parts of the fact. In
some instances there are what is called
precocity. There has been instances where chil-
dren of four years of age whose mental powers
were as much developed as persons generally
are of thirty. Now, this extraordinary devel-
opment of mind could not result from the
growth of the body; but has shot forward &
would favour the idea of the soul being
independent of the body. On the other side
whether we ought not to consider delay

the exceptions & the other the rule? The instances of old men, at any rate, are so numerous as to invalidate the objection in some degree. —

My second reply is, that the just way to account for dotage is - That they have laid aside for years their habits of activity & in a word, their mental vigour has declined through indolence. That the result in that case would be greatly accelerated by animal indulgence I doubt not. The other instances mentioned may be accounted for, by the mind's being too much pressed in early & middle life. If you take away these two there will be very few left. I have another answer: there is a remarkable distinction between those operations of the mind, which, in the exercise are connected with organic impressions & those of the pure intellect & moral powers. The difference has been observed since the days of Aristotle, who ascribed the former to sensation & the other to the rational.

My third answer is, that the body undergoes an entire change, as to the particles, once in about eight years, - so that by the conclusion of that time it is not the same

Fourth - In sleep, the soul seems to act with-
out the body, or if you keep up Aristotiles
philosophy, it is the sensation that sleeps.
This leads to another question: the immor-
tality of the soul. Most writers, when
they think they have established immate-
riality of the soul, that nothing further
is necessary to establish its immortality.
They reason thus: that nothing organized
dies by dissolution; but if the soul is im-
mortal, if it is a simple substance, it
cannot be dissolved; for dissolution means,
the separation of one part from another -
therefore it cannot die. There seems to be
great force in this argument. It shows, only
that it may be, for there may be other
ways in which a body may cease to exist
than dissolution, & if a soul is brought
into existence, why may it not go out of
existence? I go further (and it may seem
like presumption) & say, how is it possible
that God could create a thing he could
not destroy? The immortality of the soul
does not follow, even if the immateriality
of the soul be proved. - We will

proceed next to the second argument. Hope, or as it has been called "a longing after anything" - The instinct of self preservation is common to us with all animated beings; but hope in man - a longing after continual existence seems to be a higher property only possessed by man - The third argument is drawn from remorse which creates a dread of futurity in the wicked but the same may be said of this as the former - as men may hope unreasonably so they may, in like manner, have unreasonable dread. But you will say, perhaps, remorse is a reasonable dread.

Fourth, man has an order of faculties & feelings above his present condition; for example, notice his unbounded capacity & his reaching after & searching beyond more useful & happier than that which he has now obtained. This argument is of great force and to show it you need only contrast man's nature with that of brutes. The truth of the immortality of the soul, is necessary to render the correspondence complete between the world of mind & matter. - Sixth, man's

happiness here is not in proportion to his capacity - on the contrary he has ills, sufferings, which mortal animals have not (Young has expanded this in his "Night Thoughts". Seventh. Moral habits & intellectual habits become stronger & stronger to the last. Eighth. The course of human affairs is in some respects discordant without moral judgment. From an unequal distribution of good & evil in the present life (says Hume) the true inference ought to be that it will be so in future. I answer, that Hume's reply would be good were it not that our moral constitution of things (& this enables us to detect in the very irregularity of the question) a tendency to a state of more perfect order.

Lecture IV. { The truth of the immortality of the soul is necessary to render the correspondence complete between the world of mind and matter }

Lecture IV. The ninth argument is built upon the desire of posthumous fame. The strength of this desire is unknown - it is strongest in the best & most cultivated minds. Its tendency is excellent, as it ennobles the character & prompts to great & noble deeds.

It seems to have furnished a Cicero for instance a motion which sustained him in that patriotic course of conduct which marked his life.

He adverts to it in several of his orations as proof of the point in hand. But why should a man feel any concern, or anxiety about what is thought of him when he leaves this life, if in leaving it he goes out of existence and is no more? In connection with this we may observe as strengthening this argument that good men feel this more & more to the last for the good of mankind & some there are who are even willing to sacrifice their lives for these causes. Adverting to this last fact Dr Young exclaims on the supposition of the souls mortality; "Die for thy Country thou preposterous fool - may rather snatch the plank thyself & let her sink."

This sentiment (it appears to me) will apply to the whole matter, for if when we cease to exist here we cease to have any existence, we cease to have any existence we cease to exist entirely. This argument will be thought to have more or less weight to it according to mens different ways of thinking on the subject. but still a suspicion may arise that these sen-

sations are so many blind moral instincts under which nature prompts us to act for the good of the species; but still, a suspicion may arise an act where nature bequiles us into a course of conduct salutary on the whole. May not these sentiments be so many moral instincts in which nature consults the welfare of the race. Such reflections are apt to excite some reasonable doubt as to the force of the argument. I feel towards it myself as if there is more

The tenth & last. The salutary influence of the doctrine of the — soul contrasted with the tendency of the opposite doctrine, affords a strong argument in its favour & I suppose there can be little doubt of the tendency of both. Since its influence on morals & virtue is good, it goes to prove that it is true; for we will see that this & all those we have gone over except the first (the immateriality of the soul) derive their force from the belief of the existence of a God, his moral attributes & government. Any one of the arguments taken alone, has some force, but taking the

whole, it depends upon the aggregate amount. I suppose, that summing them all up, that they amount to a high moral probability i.e. renders the doctrine much more reasonable than the opposite. The wisest of the ancients were in doubt about this matter - Xenophon represents Cyrus, when about dying, talking to his two sons & expressing some doubt on the subject. He tells them not to weep at his funeral for he would either be nothing or be with the Gods, & that in either case they would have no cause to mourn. Diogenes the Cynic, when some of his disciples were speaking of disposing of his body after death, told them not to do so, but to let it lay where he happened to die. What! said they, would you have it left a prey to wild beasts: no, said he, put a club by it, proving by this that if the body could not use the club there would be no use in disposing of it. Socrates appears to have had clearer ideas of it.

That the soul seems to be dependent upon the state of the body in respect to appetites, instincts, passions, habits & vice versa, the body is dependent upon the state of the soul, for its healthy state & action -

We will next consider the natural state of man. First we say of man's natural state is, that it is social. This is of great importance of morals and ever to be kept in view & as Burke has said "Man is born in it - lives in it - & dies in it." The second proof is made up of a variety of particulars - such as his sympathy, imitation, instinctive belief, deference to opinion, power of speech, curiosity to hear & a propensity to communicate what he knows. These are all social in their nature & tendency. The third proof of it lies in the fact that his active powers are susceptible of development in the highest degree under the salutary influence of that stimulus which the mind receives through the channel of our social relations. Place a man in a state of monastic seclusion - "the world forgetting by the word forgot" & his mind languishes - withers away & withers as if for the want of nutriment. Place him, on the contrary, in the heart of some dense, busy population & all his active powers are quickened & invigorated. Increase still further the intensity of this social influence & the exercise of his faculties would become intense in a degree which is excessive & dangerous. Now, all this goes

Natural
state
of
man -

to prove that man's very nature is social. There is one exception to the two foregoing remarks that it is well enough to notice here. It is this: the rational sentiment of modesty or shame with regard to certain things disposes the individual to concealment & solitude.

Grief This exception is peculiar to human nature & is not peculiar to brutes. Grief, which arises from individual suffering and which is deep is accompanied by the same sentiment & seeks retirement & concealment; hence there is nothing more shocking than what is thought a display of private grief. There is something of this sentiment (for nature dictates it) that ought to attend deep religious feeling. It is remarkable, that the terms which belong to one set properly belong to the other. Hence monuments erected to persons are said to be Interest sacred. The fourth prop is that interest leads to society. Now another question arises: is the natural state of man a state of peace or war? Hobbs was a strong advocate for war, but most writers take the side of peace. Let it be remembered that man is evidently of a nature intended for

improvement. In the rude state of society before laws were enacted & established, there being no other way of redressing wrongs but by force; it as force can only be repelled by force this leads to war. Yet there is a counteracting tendency towards peace in man's milder nature his affections & so on. Taking these two influences together you would conclude that he is neither liable at first to one or the other; but if you consider, thirdly, as his intellect is improved & he comes to understand his interest better, his nature tends to peace; so that upon the whole if you consider him in his two states. — — —

Lecture V. The next question respecting the natural state of man: is it savage or civilized? That the savage was the natural state was an opinion very prevalent at the commencement of the French revolution. The decision of the question depends very much on what meaning you give to the word natural.

If by natural, we mean that state in which man was placed in the early stages of the world, it then may be granted that he then existed in a state, if not entirely savage

Savage
or
civilized.

yet approaching to it; but by the savage here
there would also be observed, is meant, not a
state of rude barbarism such as exists among
cannibals, but a state of primitive simplicity
in opposition to that state of civil society
which is distinguished by a multiplicity
of laws institutions & conventional arrange-
ment of which that of private property lies
at the foundation. Now if we use the words
natural & savage in the sense just used
I am inclined to think his state was naturally
savage. No History except the Mosaic
extends this far back, but the tradition of
most nations, found in their poetry give
us such a state. But, if by natural is meant
the state which nature designates as proper
& best for man & that to which his
social nature tends, then I do say, his
natural state is civilized & here I would
observe that savage nations are the most vicious.
But when we come to examine closely, savage
nations we find that they exercise Infanticide
cannibalism & all the practices of savage
warfare, selling their children, drunkenness
& extreme intemperance. In short a savage

state is characterized by the prevalence of all the
malevolent passions. It is also true, on the other
hand that there are more forms of vice in a
civilized than in a savage life & what Paul,
says in his letter to the Romans "a law was
passed that sin may abound. This may
be represented, very happily I think by a body of
land which is common at first & is then
cut up & divided off into lots each fence
serving as a law or boundary & if a person
breaks through any of them he is trespassing.
If we look at the question, as far as happi-
ness is concerned, it appears to me that the
most miserable people in civilized communi-
ties enjoy more comfort than the mass
of persons do in savage life. However,
on this subject, you will find great diver-
sity of opinion. Making all due allow-
ances on taking a closer view of the matter
& considering how few are the advantages of
savage life & how numerous its ills, ap-
proaching sometimes, to the point of extreme
wretchedness & misery. it is a question
whether the very slave in a highly civ-
ilized community is not better off
& enjoys more

This was Aristotle's way of thinking. To these considerations, may be added that to the remotest period to which history extends we see many proofs of a high state of (cultivation) civilization such for instance as was in Egypt & Chaldaea & also in China. yet it has been alleged that no nation has ever arisen out of a savage state without foreign aid. This I believe true for a considerable period before the Christian era; but, tracing the matter back, there must have been some that became so by their own efforts: for to suppose that one nation was lifted out by another would lead you around in a circle.

We will close this series of preliminary enquiries by taking a view of man's capacity for enjoyment. There are five. We will begin with the lowest & will mention the first as that which arises from the senses, appetites animal & feelings. This we have in common with brutes. The second in order is the capacity which exists in his powers of taste & imagination. This capacity, at pleasure, is stronger in the other sex & the former is stronger in the other sex. The third exists in his affections - Now powerful this is may be seen in this that

whatsoever makes those to us towards
whom we ought to cherish kind & benevolent
makes us miserably as it casts

The fourth is in his desires attended with
hope. This has been so universally observed
that it has been made a question whether
there is more pleasure in the pursuit or
in the enjoyment. Nature kindly
cheats us - promising more than she performs.
The fifth is his reason, conscience & moral
feeling. The pleasure we derive from this
has been explained in our lectures on
conscience to which I refer you. I will
conclude by observing that there is a set of
feelings belonging to each of these, except
the first, which raises the mind to - - -

— & this is attended with feelings the
more delightful. Yet there is a kind of
bodily feeling, animal enthusiasm which
may be produced by a corresponding feeling
in the senses & bodily feelings - more noise
will go a great ways to produce it. This
is observable in children & men too, ^{who} when
much excited generally, make a great noise.

Theory
of
Utility

This principle when drawn forth gives rise to a regular scheme of duties. The principle itself is expressed in a short definition. There are several such principles: first that of the Stoics who made virtue to consist in acting agreeably to nature. Clarke has extended and enlarged upon this principle & has in his analogy, beautifully explained it. The second is the Theory of utility insisted on & illustrated by Tucker & his admirer Paley. The principle is simply this: that whatever is useful is right & right because it is useful; but utility must thus be considered as being universally useful. According to this universal rule, of utility it is right for that reason & is to be performed for that end. The third principle is Woolaston in his "Religion of Nature" who makes truth the principle of nature i.e. he reduces an action to ——— if the proposition contained in the statement is true then the action is virtuous. This Theory differs but little from that of the Stoics —.

Woolaston
in his
Religion
of
Nature

The fourth scheme is founded on the (scheme) of Self-love; It makes virtue to consist in acting with a view regard to the actor's best interest. The fifth scheme makes sympathy the principle
x principle

explained by Smith, explained in his "Theory of
natural sensations. The sixth makes admiration
Turnes Theory. The seventh is Edwards's scheme
who makes the love of universal being or
existence or benevolence
his scheme, & self love or selfishness to be
the principle of all vice. Edwards's scheme
differs only in words from Tuckers -
It begins by contemplating the universe as one
grand system. ~ " ~ " ~ " ~ " ~ " ~ "

Lecture VII.

I shall not detain you as to the foregoing
remarks, yet there is something true in all of
them. What we call moral virtue is that Moral
virtue
property of an action, which the mind, in the
exercise of its moral feelings pronounces to be
in conformity with the nature & moral
relations of the (object), agent. I will give
you the best definition I have been able to
find. What we call conscience pronounces
the judgment, reason & reflection make out
the case for the judge; & when they make out
the case fairly the judgment is in most
cases - The next, wherein consists the

excellence of virtue, or in other words what entitles it to our preference? There are four answers to this question. The first ascribes it to the will of God. By this it is not meant that the will of God is so virtuous, that what he wills is perfect for that is granted; but the reason that the will of God as the law-giver makes the distinction between virtue & vice. This is the doctrine of the Moravians; but it is capable of great abuse & in fact, is an error. It takes away the distinction between moral & positive duties, or as they are called by some writers, moral natural & moral positive but for the sake of simplicity they are called moral & positive. By the first, are considered such as are binding in themselves, independent of the subject; & by the second, such as become binding in consequence of Law on the subject. To make it more plain I will take an example. For instance, before there was any law on the subject about wagoons meeting, they could take either side of the road & this explains the first; but now that the law is established, they are obliged to pass to the right & if the driver does not do this &

another sustain any injury he is accountable
in the eye of the Court. This explains the second.
The one is right because it is connived at.
The other because it is right. is connived at.^{1st}

I answer secondly, that it unhinges our
notion of the moral character of God himself
& this I get from Mithraspooy. It would
then have no meaning to say that God is
holy, good, just if what is so depends merely
upon his arbitrary will. I observe, thirdly,
that the opinion is absurd & inconsistent
with itself. My second answer is, that
excellence of virtue is the reason & nature
of Things. In other words, it is excellent
per se. For the same reason, whoever has
ascertained that a thing is virtuous has
ascertained that he ought to do it. My third
answer is public interest, utility. This is
Paley's philosophy. Fourth Private inter-
est makes its tendency to consist in the
promotion of own individual happiness.
It is objectionable because it gives too much
force to our selfish principles which
need a check rather than a stimulus.
First, all men have framed to themselves

Public

Interest

Private

do

the distinct ideas of duty and interest as appears from their forms of speech. Second the emotions of which we are conscious, on the contemplation of conduct guided and formed with a view to interest and that which arises from a sense of duty or right are entirely different. Third. views on interest are complex & so ----- . Those of duty are plain and simple. Fourth. Children, long before they have distinct views of interest & happiness are susceptible of moral emotions arising from approbation & disapprobation. See the story of Cain's Forfeiture. Fifth, the theories which found virtue on utility take away the excellency of virtue itself, place it in something else, viz, its tendency. The objections of Locke have been stated and refuted in metaphysics to which I refer you. But sixth. It must be considered that the obligation of virtue is strengthened by a regard to utility as well as by sentiments of piety & the divine will.

Lecture VIII.

There has been mixed up with the foregoing

subjects a question which we will here notice.
& you will readily see its connection with the
foregoing speculations. The question is. is virtue
its own reward? & of course of this will follow
is vice its own punishment? The affirmative
of this has been much insisted upon by
Shaftsbury & others. I make the following
remarks. First, the primary obligation of
virtue arises from its own intrinsic worth.
A regard to interest is not excluded but is
of a secondary consideration. My second
remark is that hope of reward is intimately
blended with conscience itself. It is a sen-
timent of nature & not mercenary. When
extended to a future state for its object it
does not change its nature for the rewards of
virtue there consist in a state of perfect
virtue. My third remark is that the present
reward of virtue & punishment of vice would
be materially diminished were future rewards
& punishments out of view. My fourth an-
swer. It is not the most wicked, who feel
the most remorse, nor the best, who feel
the least of it. This should not be so if
virtue is its own reward & of vice its

own punishment. That persons who have given themselves find some mode of false reasoning by which they exculpate themselves. My fifth remark. The argument for a future state founded on the unequal distribution of good and evil in the present life is destroyed by this principle if it be true. Sixth, Human virtue here is imperfect and needs the consideration of interest to support it. Seventh, under the government of a wise and good being no man can be required to sacrifice his interest on the whole. We proceed now after these preliminary disquisitions as they may be considered on the nature of man to the division of our duties which were divided by the Ancients divided according to the principles whence they are considered to spring. These principles they called the cardinal virtues, which were, prudence, temperance, justice & fortitude. From the one or the other of which or from the combination of them all they supposed all virtuous actions to spring. - From their making prudence a cardinal virtue

division
of our
duties

The next is temperance. This also they explained in a large sense as extending to & embracing moderation in all the desires & appetites & all our acting principles as well as our appetites to which last the word is confined among us. Justice is next. This also they used in an extended sense as comprehending all that is due from one man to another. We distinguish justice from benevolence making them two separate virtues. So far also fortitude, or virtue as they called it was taken in a large sense - divided into two branches - the one active, as natural courage - the other passive, viz patience. The moderns, perhaps more intelligently, rank our duties according to their objects. into three classes viz, those which we owe to God, to our neighbor & others & to ourselves - ~~Here, we must necessarily~~ prove the existence of a God. Three arguments for this: ^{the} first is called the argument a priori - a metaphysical argument proceeding from first principles, explained at large by Clarke - Time & space are necessary and unbounded. They are

not substances - They are therefore attributes
of a being who is eternal & omnipresent -
who is "Semper est ad est ubique," (Newton)
The second a priori is more clear. It
may begin thus, I exist: The cause of my
existence is either caused or uncaused
if uncaused it is God. The third is
common consent of mankind. The present
opinions of men on this great subject
may be brought under our notice in consid-
ering the Antithesis, the Atheist, the
Polytheist, the Pantheist & lastly the
Theist or Monothist. The Antithist is
a man who positively says that there is
no God. The Atheist, says not positively
that there is no God, but that he does
not know that there is. The Polytheist
believes that there are more gods than
one. The Pantheist believes that the
universe collectively is God. The Theist
or monothist, believes that there is but
one God - a spiritual & eternal essence
distinct from nature, in other words
an intelligent first cause & universal
governor. — " — " — " — " —

Lecture VIII. We proved I think in the last
Lecture that there was a God. We will now proceed
to show that there is an intelligent first cause.
The sum of the argument is this: that there
are evident marks of design in all parts
of the universe subject to our observation.
It is assumed in this, as a first principle
that design proves intelligence. This I
say is a self evident truth & when we
meet in any author's discourse on this subject
their design is not to prove but to place
before us instances. That this truth is not
derived from experience nor the deduction
is clear: it must therefore be a primary
truth that is, intuitive judgment. It has
this mark of a primary truth, that all
men believe it. prior to any proof. —
We will now give you ^{an} ~~for~~ substantiation,
this argument, but for furnishing instances
in nature wherein marks of design
are discoverable which we will classify
and which constitute articles of use in
themselves. The first class is found in
the adaption of organized bodies to the
laws of the material world; for instance

the organs of respiration, adapted to the properties of the atmosphere - of the eye to light - the ear to the air as a medium of hearing - the size of animals & vegetables to gravitation &c. &c. Certain species of fish are immensely larger than any land animals - so much for the first class - The second class. Is the adaption of the inhabitants of the air, earth & water to their elements respectively & of particular species to their particular situations. for instance, the camel is placed in the desert & can do without food & water for a long time - the rein deer, in cold countries & they are admirably suited for utility to those who need them - The crystalline lense in the fishes eye is more convex than in land animals & the greater the density of the ~~medium~~ through which he sees requires this. Then too, the iris of the eye does not contract in the land animal - The birds eye is provided with a long hoop to elongate the axis of the eye, here again design is manifest. It is also furnished with a muscle called

which draws back the crystalline lense
& this aids them to see remote objects -
The eye of the eel is protected from injury
by a pair of spectacles which it can see
through. I would next call your attention
what is called the gastric juice found in
the stomach of animals which assists in
dissolving food. The next thing is what
~~the~~ is called secretion. There are twenty
different fluids produced by secretions -
I will mention a few viz, gastric juice
saliva, bile, mucilage of the joints, tears,
ear wax &c all of which point out design.
The use of saliva is to moisten the food
we will next notice what is called Assimila-
tion. This name is given to that process by
which blood is converted into muscles, bones,
membranes, tendons flesh &c. There are
two kinds of joints viz, the ball & socket
& the hinge joint. The former can be seen
in the jacob staff - the other in the car-
penters compass. Observe the ends of the
two. The plan is the same, but the ball
& socket you can move in any direction.
The first joint between the head & neck

Assim-
ilation

Joints
Ball
&
Socket
&
Hinge
joint

is a hinge joint, which allows the head to move
in one plain & that joint is used in nodding.
*Immediately below this & next to it is a
ball & socket joint used when you turn
your head horizontally. Your head can be
turned one hundred & twenty degrees of a
circle. Vadus & Ulna. These are a hinge
joint too at the elbow. The spine - we
call by this name that column of bones
that run up the back. It has twenty
four joints, so curiously formed as to
answer these purposes: first of flexure;
secondly, to afford a safe passage for the
spinal marrow; thirdly, to give out through
its notches pairs of nerves running to
each side of the body, both to afford a
basis for the ribs with their muscles -
*Next, we will mention the chest. It
dilates & so as to admit from forty two, to
one hundred cubic inches of air & contracts
so as to expell it again. This is provided
for by the obliquity of the - which
expand as they are pushed up. The pla-
teas or Kne-pan & Shoulder blade -
all the other bones are united as parts of

Vadus
&
Ulna
Spine

Chest

the system, but these last mentioned are parts put on. There is a hinge joint at the knee & a ball & socket at the hip. There is a strong ligament in the middle of the cup at the knee joint. I notice finally, that the blood vessels pass the joints by defiles & covered ways. The third class: the relations of the mineral vegetable & animal kingdoms. Fourth class: the relations of animals to animals. I will close this head of relations by noticing the fifth viz the migratory instincts of animals.

Lecture IX

The next general class of facts or observations tending to the same point is analogies & this I would place first that of comparative anatomy which treats of the organization & structure of different species of animals compared with one another. This comparison leads to a certain general standard or general idea to which they are all reduced by so doing.

Thus by taking the human race you ascertain
the standard for height - That general stan-
dard is precisely such as is required by the
situation & mode of life of the animal -
The second in order is the analogies of vegetables
& animals - Here the analogy is slighter
than between animals; yet it is sufficiently
plain to an enlightened mind. for instance
the way in which they propagate - draw nu-
trition - in which they draw nutrition in
which the juices run - the sap corresponding
to the blood in animals & lastly, in their
growth & decay. Third, the analogies of the
laws of the material world & another time
our eye is Franklins proving that a
spark of electricity & lightning are one & the
same. Birds are oviparous & land animals
are viviparous. Now is that birds in laying
only lay as many eggs as they can cover, or
that in feeding their young, as they do by
bringing small pieces of worms that they
do not give too much to one & not enough
to another - This evidently shows design.
See also the equality between males & females
I ask of what management is it that this equality

you can hardly say it is from chance - it ^{therefore} must be from design - Another fact. that the young of all kinds are not brought forth till the season brings the appropriate food. See the eggs of the silkworm which hatch at the very time that the mulberry leaf puts forth. Another remark. all animals are furnished by nature with the means of defence & with implements suited for procuring their food. ^{For} The structure of the fishes tail perpendicular & that of the bird horizontal - the tail of the bird & the fins of the fish performing the same office. The necks & legs of all land birds are commensurate except the ones I shall mention - A large class are called waders & while they stand on the ground their bills can just reach as low as their feet. ^{Water fowl} that can dive are an exception also the elephant, the only exception among land-animals - ^{The} The prolific power of animals ^{is} called another instance of design - ^{See} Sevonbeck says that eight millions can occupy a space not larger than a grain of sand. ^{The} The spherical form

of the earth is made to answer two purposes -
one is for its revolution & in its revolutions
Every point in the heavens are visible so
that is a very convenient observatory - - -
The axis is always parallel to itself - Another
remark. The convenient positions of the
organs of the body - the nose, with the olfa-
ctories placed where it ought to be, for here is the
road & the sentinel placed right above it -
Where could the eyes & ears be better placed
than where they are? I remark further
that the vital parts, that the heart, the spine
& the arterial system are all carefully
protected. We will next notice the double
organs. Draw a line perpendicularly from
the nose to the chest & on each side you
have double organs. E - - - The
name is applied to a part of the system
containing innumerable parts -

The Muscles. According to Galen there
are six hundred more than six hundred
muscles each requiring two conditions -

According to this there must be six thou-
sand conditions - every one performing its
functions in a proper manner -

¹ There are two hundred & eighty four bones, each requiring forty conditions - If you make the multiplication, you have a hundred thousand conditions. The appetite in inferior animals chooses only such food as is wholesome, but with man it is left in a great measure to his reason.

² Diversity of human features & voices, handwriting though something similar are different. The teeth grow out in proportion as they wear: if this was not the case they would soon wear out - They have no membranous covering. ³ In the cavity of the jaw-bone there is an artery - a vein & a nerve - a branch of which extends to every tooth. Infants want their white as the young animals have their & you will see the reason for this. They come of dykes & then they are weaned - They always shed their first teeth & the reason for this I think is, that it insures them a good set in case they should loose any white young -

Lecture X. The tongue, the wind-pipe, the pylorus the heart, the hand the eye the

back-bone or spine I select from the others as affording the most obvious proof of design. The tongue is most admirably calculated for the three fold (purposes) functions of articulating sounds in speech - of moving the food in the mouth - & of tasting at the same time.

Mind-
pipe

In the front part of the neck there are two tubes made of cartilage - one of these is called the mind pipe. The other tube through which the food descends is connected immediately below the palate with this & to prevent the descent of food into this it there is a piece called epigloss which acts as a valve. In swallowing hastily the food, or fluid, frequently touches this which causes strangulation.

Heart

This is a great muscle of very subtle texture divided into two compartments called right & left ventricles, by the alternate dilation & contraction of which blood is produced. Plato compares the internal system to a citadel well regulated town in which he calls the heart the citadel. Harvey discovered that the arteries run one way & the veins another. The arteries run outwards, and become less & less - the veins inward & grow larger & larger.

as they approach the heart. Let the Gulf of Mexico represent the heart & the Mississippi Swells represent the veins - Invert it & you have the arteries - its branches representing its different branches in the body. See the end to be answered by the articulations of the back-bone. If it were one entire bone, it could not be bent - were there only a few it would present a polygon and the strain would be too great on particular parts - The lubrication of the joints by means of an oil from the marrow united with a mucus from a gland, answers the two purposes of lubricity & tenacity - Next the metamorphosis of animals - the caterpillar & musquettee for instance - the one of which becomes a butterfly - the other, at first is an egg which hatches on the water - Next, the bones at the joints are tipped with a gristle, & where the pressure is great (as at the knee-joint) there is a loose (house) gristle interposed somewhat circular in its form. Having mentioned the muscles before, I will say, that whatever motion the joint is fitted to perform the muscle is adapted to that motion &

to no other; & secondly as the muscle acts by contraction the motion of the limb in opposite directions requires antagonist muscles - which are called flexors & extensors. The third law is that they do not interfere. There is only one exception to this & it is this: that you can't gaze & swallow at the same time. Fourthly, As the action of the muscle is often wanted in a situation where it cannot be conveniently placed an additional contrivance is necessary. The most convenient method of moving the hand would be to have the muscles placed on it; but they are in the arm & the tendons in the hand, with a strap round the wrist to keep them in their places - Now, if there was one out of the six hundred muscles out of fix, to what inconvenience would it put us -

The fifth remark. that act
in the same way as fence-strings & sometimes occasion a good deal of inconvenience by being out of order. Sixth, different muscles help in various ways. Sometimes by producing a diagonal motion, not by pulling, but in the shape of a diagonal

vacans about one hundred -
muscles employed in one breath. The
muscles of the iris & the drum are so
fine as only to be discerned by a micro-
scope. The art of man cannot approach
anything like this - so fine - so perfect - &
so strong: surely there is design in all this
Eighth. In the nature of things, but
one of two (things), ends can be accom-
plished, where motion is concerned.

*Celerity or force. It being a law
of mechanics that whatever is gained
in power is lost in time. She has
abandoned force for celerity so far
as individual power is concerned. -

*The lower jaw is pulled down by the di-
gastric muscle, which runs over a pulley
in the ashyordes. *Tenth. The tendon
which binds the first joint in the toe
or finger passes through a slit in
the one that binds the second. -

*We pass now to the circulation of the
blood. The mass of blood in a full
grown man is ascertained to be about
twenty five pounds. At every beat

of the heart about an ounce or two table
spoon fulls is driven into the arteries
The heart beats about eighty times in
a minute, or four thousand eight hundred
times an hour: therefore the whole mass
of blood circulates about, or upwards
of fourteen times an hour, about once
in four minutes. The heart of the whale
sends out from ten to fifteen gallons
at every stroke. The great artery is
called the aorta - that of the whale is
a foot in diameter. There are two sets
of vessels, arteries & veins - the former
more strong to resist the tendency of an outward
current as drawn into a narrowed channel.
Both are furnished with valves to prevent
regurgitation. Second, notice the
the heart in the system of the third
part of the process, the digestion by which
the food is prepared.

Lecture XII.

We will next notice what is called the
passage of the body. The internal
cavity of the body or trunk contains the

the lungs, heart stomach liver kidneys &c
which taken together are of no inconsider-
able bulk, & yet they are so disposed - of
as to leave each one free to perform its
particular functions, without interference
from the rest. Second, the beauty of the
human form. Third, the faculty of
standing which requires an effort though
not apparent without a person be tired.
A statue may be made to stand, but falls
at the least touch. This too, show con-
trivance. I will now give you some
instances of comparative anatomy. The
first general remark respects the clothing
of different animals; which are composed
of hair, wool, feathers, quills, prickles,
scales, laminae & plates. These materials
show a manifest adjustment of nature to
the properties of the animals; for instance
the animals of the north (the frigid zone)
are protected from cold by very fine
fur, which is a poor conductor & pre-
vents animal heat from escaping.
In the warm & torrid zone, this becomes
coarser & at the torrid they are covered

with a coarse hair - Next we will take the
mouths of different animals & examine them
Take the dog the ox the sheep - the Elephant
& you will see how every variation of
different species has respect to the ways
of the animals living. The proper food
of the hog is roots, hence his long
jaw to enable him to masticate his food.
The horse's mouth shows that he is intended
to feed on grass - The sheep the same.
The proboscis of the Elephant serves it as
a hand by which it feeds itself. Compare
next, with these, the bills of birds, that of
the sparrow, the snipe, the woodcock, the
duck, & you see an analogy between your
mouth & that of the sparrow though not
very apparent at first. The bill of the
hawk is hooked & formed to separate
the flesh from the bones of birds -
Different from all these is the duck, which
is furnished with an apparatus called the
filter by which the mud & trash is
separated from its food. The third gen-
eral remark respects the fibres of the gullet
of animals. Fourth, the intestines of,

graniferous animals are long. Those of the Cambodian stay are said to be nearly six feet in length. The reason of this is evident: for it requires a long time for the grass to become meat. Those of carnivorous animals are short. The bones of birds are cylindrical and are so formed for strength. The lungs of birds are so arranged that they can inflate themselves - Birds are all oviparous -

Next their instruments of motion such as feet, wings, fins, circular feelers as in reptiles. Catfishes or warm blooded fish, have their tail horizontal (the whale for example) for the purpose of coming to the top of the water to breathe. The web footed come next - the very mention of which shows design. Next the five senses. It is needless to descend to minutiae on these. Peculiarities. The word itself suggests the meaning [It is something distinct from something] It is some particularity. Next notice. The fat was in heavy headed quadrupeds. Second, the oil glands near the bodies of birds which they alone have & which they alone want.

Third, the air bladder of fishes fourth, the
fangs of a serpent. Fifth the pouch of
the opossum sixth the stomach of the
camel: seventh, the barbed tongue of the
woodpecker: eighth the bent & hooked
teeth of the Indian hog - springing from
its upper jaw - Next, prospective contrivance
We will mention first, the first set of
teeth in infants: second, the eye & lungs;
next, Relation. first, the relation of
parts in animals which are subservient
to digestion, assimilation, circulation
nutrition - all these must be taken together
to complete the entire process. Second of
the kidneys with the urethrae - the eyes
to the rest of the body - third, of the
parts in different bodies - the web foot
neck & muffle of the goose & swan are
similar. Fourth, the whale. Its snout, form
eye - slick skin - short palmated feet or
scrapers all viewed together are adapted -
the one to the other. * Compensation.
For its short neck & unwieldy head, the
elephant is compensated by its proboscis.
Second, the hook of the bat wing

4th the bill of the parrot by which it holds
on to limbs & climbs - 5th the spider
who, though he cannot fly - can catch
flies - his compensation is his web &
balloon. The eyes of certain insects which
are immovable are multangular - others
have many eyes - the spider has sixes,
eight. 7th the sea fox or - - -
has a short intestine, but is compensated
by having it a spiral passage - -
8th, the spiral shell fish grows at
the large end of his spine; but the
lobster only grows forty eight hours
during the year & has to hide in order
to grow this much as he is destitute of
a shell & liable to be attacked -
9th the want of upper teeth in the
teeth - the ox & deer - The want of
long legs in reptiles is supplied by lon-
gitudinal & angular fibres -

Lecture XIII

The attributes of God are natural necess-
ary existence or independence, eternity
ubiquity or immensity, spirituality
omniscience & omnipotent. The

Moral are holiness, justice, truth, goodness
& mercy. Third, intermediate, wisdom.
The natural partakes of a moral (view)
nature. By a necessary existence or
independence is meant that the exis-
tence of a deity is transposed to all
derived existence. Eternity is his dura-
tion from a -- without beginning
to a -- without end. Ubiquity
or immensity is that attribute of the
being "which he is everywhere - not by
being or existence, but by agency."
Spirituallity may be said to be the very
nature of God. Omniscience or infin-
ite knowledge expresses its own mean-
ing. Moral attributes, all writers have
found a difficulty in explaining holiness.
I myself am unable to say what it is
without it is the purity of the divine
Character - that attribute possessed by
God which corresponds to a sense of
honour in man - that attribute that
disposes him to maintain his hon-
our. (This / honor) Justice has been called
vindictive & distributive - I call it

rectoral justice & I call it thus because
it belongs to the ruler of the Society—
+ There has been some difficulty with many
minds whether there is a disposition in
God to punish sin on its own account
independent of, or aside from the end to
be accomplished by it, or the reformation
of the sinner, or the example to others
& the same difficulty exists as
regards rectoral justice among men. &
there is now a dispute about it among
lawyers, statesmen & divines. It is usually
mixed up with capital punishment—
My perception dictates to me that
sin deserves punishment, independent
of all consequences—just as virtue de-
serves reward. I can see no distinc-
tion between them. Goodness is a dis-
position to promote happiness. That
the objects of it are undeserved—
+ There can be no exercise of mercy
where it would not be right to pun-
ish—I will here mention, that were
I to make two classes, (the natural
& moral,) I should place wisdom

among the moral. as far as the selection
of the means, it is a natural attribute.
I therefore place it in an intermediate
position. Wisdom always suspects ac-
tion & all its dictates suppose some
action. Knowledge suspects no action.
The formula of the schoolmen, *Via*
negationis, *via causalitatis* & *via eminentialis*. I shall here notice an objection
to the goodness of God. From the exis-
tence of evil - natural & moral in his
universe. This has been the great
of moral philosophy in all ages & I may
observe also that it does not belong
exclusively to the religious person.
Systems or theories which have been
introduced for the purpose of removing
this difficulty, the difficulty is this: if
he is infinitely good he would have
prevented it, or if infinitely powerful
he would have prevented it. Second
the doctrine or system of Zoroaster
revised by Mani - called in History
Manichaeism. It can be traced to the
most ancient times. According to this

there were two first principles or deities
a good & bad - the good called oror-
mades & the bad ahromand or ahri-
manius - the good desires to promote
& advance the cause of human hap-
piness & the other the cause of all evil.

Third, the theory of optimism which
is briefly this: that the existence of
evils is necessary in order to the greatest
good, as Pope expresses it "all partial
evil, universal good". It has two mod-
ifications, first, that of those who
denying the force of agency of man
reduce everything to the laws of physi-
cal necessity. These maintain that
there is, in the very nature of things,
an invincible necessity - that a cer-
tain quantity of evil should exist
in order to the greatest possible hap-
piness on the whole, but this is to cut
the knot, not to solve it & to banish
everything like virtue from the world.

Second of those who allowing to
man the power of free agency ascrib-
ing to the government of the world

a firm basis in the establishment of
general laws accounts for mans
moral evil by the abuse of the first.
For natural evil by his neglecting to
obey, or wantonly violating the same.
† The substance of this answer would
be perhaps better when expanded by
the following remarks. First, it was
evidently the design of God that
there should be virtue, which, without
the virtue of free agency, these could
not be & free agency in the finite
being is liable to error. Second, the
greater part by far of the ills of life
are brought upon men by themselves or
are mutually inflicted. † Instances of
the first and second are drunkenness
& war. The third difficulty is appo-
sition. Pains there must be in a
Theatre constructed for the exercise
& display of fortitude, heroism
magnitude, patience generosity, hu-
manity, compassion & such like virtues.
The power of contrast has great
efficacy in heightning enjoyment.

Lecture XVIII. In the fifth place, there is a pleasure in the pursuit of desirable objects, which is heightened & enhanced by difficulties which are encountered or of obstacles which are overcome. The most unhappy of the human race are those who, left without the interest which engagement in some rational pursuit creates are forced in order to allay the intolerable pangs of ennui, to resort to artificial & vicious means of stimulating the mind. For instance the gambler. The mere desire of gaming never would produce that anxiety without it was accompanied by some risk & danger. The only way of accounting for it is that happiness in employment of all the faculties & the higher the employment the better. It is impossible to create this interest without some danger; but having explained it before, I shall not mention it here. Seventhly, the human constitution is made to be so pliable under the power of habit, that things, at first disagreeable cease at length to be so, or, are either converted into pleasure; hence men

in nearly all situations are happier than they seem to be. The essentials of happiness are like the common gifts of nature, provided for all her children. - (The principles) This is proved by the fact, that there are few persons who would be willing to change their situation for any other. This is beautifully illustrated in a number of the Spectator.

* Eighth, nature has attached pleasurable sensations to the exercise of all our senses & other powers, so that in fact our capacities for pleasure are just as numerous as are our faculties. Not content with every food of life to nourish man, thou madest all nature pleasant to his eye & music to his ear. ^{Purposes -} * The pleasures of life could have been answered without these pleasures - Eating for instance could have been a mere mechanical thing without the pleasure resulting from appetite. * Ninth, whatever instances in nature there may seem to be opposed to the conclusion founded on the above remarks they ought to be attributed to our ignorance. There is an objection drawn from the

mortality of animated beings & from
the fact that certain animals are evidently
made to live upon others may in part be
answered thus: I say in part for it is highly
probable that animals when killed by others
do not suffer as much as those that
die a natural death. There is one remark
that all naturalists have made & that
is, that the instinct of the beast or bird
of prey directs it to strike its victim
where the stroke is almost instantly mor-
tal. Putting these four remarks together
you have I think an argument of suf-
ficient force, to overturn the objection
& demonstrate the goodness of the Cre-
ator - His mercy is also proved as many
other of his attributes are, but in its nature
it is vague. By the course of providence
we do not see, that offenders are instantly
punished, but are reprieved for a time
but this may be to make the punishment
more severe. N.B.

The next great question is: what kind of a government the Deity exercises over matter? There are seven opinions - first, that of the materialist, viz, that the phenomena are the result of inherent, essential, active properties itself, second, that there must result from certain active properties, communicated to matter at the first formation Third answer, that opinion which ascribes them to certain general laws Fourth, that which ascribes them to Plastic nature - Cutlerworth. has ably set forth in defence of this opinion; fifth that which ascribes them to so many different minds. Monbodo & Kepper support this. I forgot to mention of Cutlerworth plastic nature. this; that nature is an existence separate from the divine power & works with that power a machine set up and put in motion at first by the mighty fiat of the great architect & continuing to move according to the impulse then given to it. Seventh answer, that which supposes a divine power constantly exercised throughout nature & without

intermission maintaining & regulating all
the order & connection of all things -
Whichever opinion we adopt as regards
matter, we are apt to think that the
mind is subject to a different government
& this we call moral government such
as is conducted by motives applied to
free agency. This is proved in two ways
first by the moral sentiments of which we
are conscious & secondly, from the course
of events. The moral government of
God so far as developed in the experience
of man here in this life is called providence.
It is regulated by general laws yet not
so as to preclude the especial interference
of divine agency on extraordinary occasions.
On the subject of - - - there are
two extremes to be avoided. The first
is the opinion of those who seem to think
that providence acts (towards them at
least) as a similar spirit or genius -
interfering with their concerns on all
occasions. Let a man beware how
he thinks himself the pet lamb of God,
the weak superstition of some weak

but well meaning persons are calculated to
bring a reproach upon that subject
which they wish to recommend. The
second extreme is that of those who nei-
ther recognise the hand of providence
in anything, nor look for it in the great-
est exigencies; but who think & act as if
God had forsaken the earth, nor con-
cerned himself in the affairs of men. —
"But a moral government being adapted
to mind & not matter, these laws have
less regularity & produce less calculation
& indeed afford greater scope for the
rays of divine providence. Gods right
to govern is founded first on his infin-
ite wisdom, second, on his almighty
power & in his supreme excellence & as
he made all things he certainly has a
right to govern them — " — " — " —

Lecture XIV

Third in his belief. It is natural to speak truth as well as to give credit to things told to us. a lie springs always from some other vice. To suppose, as Paley does, that utility can justify falsehood is a loose (kind of reasoning) morality. One, to be sure is not bound to tell all he knows, but let what he does tell be the truth. Silence is often a virtue. * Malicious lying is a complicated crime. * We must distinguish, however, between lying & figures of speech. Fiction is often applied as a vehicle of truth, a parable an apologue, or any other form of fictitious composition may have an important moral which is true. * The incidents

are feigned but there is no deception in the case. * Honey is no exception to the law of veracity. The sentiment we utter is of course a lie

The Oriental style which abounds in hyperbole would probably deceive a person unacquainted with it. What is it that constitutes a lie. I answer: when there is a professed design to declare the truth & the speaker does not it is then a lie.

all men when they speak soberly profess this but when a person deceives nobody ^{means} nor professes to do so it is not so —

* There is too what is calledocular lying One of Dr. Mesbets pupils when telling of the inhabitants of the South Sea Islands described them as having very long ears & the Doctor wishing to ridicule it said:

man that nothing! the ears of the Highlanders reach to the ground & when they lie down at night they lie on one & cover with the other. There is also what is called officious lying by which children & sick persons are deceived

It is often practiced by physicians & nurses but I must say that I am against it - & I don't know on what ground it can be vindicated. "Not at home" too is very common & I think wrong, for though it may be understood by the parties & not do any harm yet it originated in a lie. The fact that compliments are understood in polite life will take away the blame, but still they are a kind of masquerade to conceal the real sentiments. Witherspoon condemns evasive phrases, because they convey the intimation of telling the exact truth. I think the remark too general, for I think that it is according to how it may be understood, for there is no set of gestures to signify any particular thing. But generally speaking I think it wrong. "Whenever the evasion amounts only to this that we do not tell the whole truth. In a case where a person is going on a journey & has to end he may tell one, without lying on being questioned, if he wishes to conceal the other. Signs are either natural connecting & customary - Natural are such as have

a natural connection with the thing as a picture is the resemblance of a man - wings of flight &c. Instituted such as have no natural resemblance. Language is of this kind. In the use of signs the same rule holds as with speech. Where we do not profess to use signs to reveal our purpose we may use such as we know will lead to a wrong conclusion. We see on this principle that we justify stratagems & false movements in war - because the Generals do not profess to reveal their motives - I was owing to this that Napoleon owed his great success with the Dutch - Another very difficult question agitated by moralists is subscription to articles - It is of great importance in England; In the first place no man should by his conscience subscribe articles agreed to under that there contain the truth - the whole truth & nothing but the truth - all such I hold to be wrong - as snares to conscience & that if they are well guarded against it will preclude all difficulties. It is the fault of ^{an} honest man

thus subscribing, if he change his opinion, to
Come out & avow it. Some persons think, that
a persons in giving in evidence, is bound to
tell everything: now this is not the case
for you are only obliged to tell everything
that is pertinent. Fourth, In his affections.
a person is injured in his affections when
the friend is drawn from him by a third per-
son who is called a seducer. There is another
case of it in marriage which is of the most
atrocious deed for here it is done under
the garb of friendship & sometimes
precipitates the whole family into ruin.
The tattler, or tale-bearer is of the same class.
Fifth, a person may be injured in his vir-
tue by being corrupted. The wretch who
does this is a criminal of no ordinary
turpitude. The young & heedless are to
beware of such persons. There is an
expense on the part of the corrupt to
make others like themselves which is easily
accounted for: they do it sometimes to have
them as companions - sometimes, from
interested motives & there may be instan-
ces where they do it for mere mischief.

An author who disseminates evil principles by means of a book into a public in a sly & insinuating manner, dressed off by Rhetoric & sophistry, deserves censure. Such an one is Gibbon who devoted his whole life to it. The flatterer is another who has a most corrupting influence on the human heart awakening pride & laying the mind open to almost every vicious influence. He should therefore to be detested as he has always some base & selfish purpose to be answered. Fifth, In his sensibility. Under this head may be comprehended what the French call *la petite morale*, or as we call it politeness. If you will take the great rules & principles of Christianity & carry them out in all these smaller matters of conduct & behavior you will form a standard of true politeness which will pass well in all civilized countries. You can find a complete course of directions for this in the 12th Chapter of Romans & the thirteenth chapter of the Epistles to the Corinthians —

† Seventh, In a judicial sentence which ^{involves} conflict,
sentences inequally where pain is inflicted.
There is an old & very true maxim to this
amount "a man's manners make his for-
tune." The injury inflicted in this case
is very detestable & the more so as
regards the persons feelings, for he receives
wrong where he expects right. N.B. There
is a certain state of the mind termed can-
dor which is in fact a species of justice
& deserves high commendation. It is
manifested in allowing to others, espe-
cially rivals, their just merit in point
of talents & moral worth, Secondly, in
judging favourably of the motives of others
& thirdly, in conducting controversy with
fairness. It would be well to study these
three particulars as they are of great im-
portance. To do justice to the claims of
others when they seem to conflict with
our own is very difficult. When this
takes place in matters of property it is
called honesty. Pope uses the word in
a much greater latitude when he says
"An honest man is the noblest work of ^{God}."

The second way in which this may be done is to the public. Here it may be done in most of the ways in which it may be done individually; but besides these ways the public is often injured by persons filling offices to which they are incompetent, or the duties of which they do not discharge.

Lecture XVI

The second class come under the head of benevolence. Benevolence is an active & steady desire of doing good to others as we have opportunity. The following from Pope's Moral Essay is a fine instance of it.

But all our praises why should lords express?
Rise honest muse! and sing the Man of Ross
Pleased Baga echoes through her winding bounds,
And rapid Severn hoarse applause resounds.
Who hung with woods you mountain's sultry brow?
From the dry rock who made the waters flow?
Not to the skies in useless columns tost
Or in proud falls magnificently lost
But clear and artless pouring through the plain
Health to the sick & solace to the swain,

"Whose causeway parts the vale with shady rows?
Whose seats the weary traveller repose?
Who taught the heaven-directed spire to rise?"

"The Man of Ross!" each lisping babe replies.
Behold the market place with poor overspread!

The Man of Ross divides the weakly bread;
He feeds your alms-house, neat, but void of state,
Where age and want sit smiling at the gate.

Thim portion'd maids, apprenticed orphans
The young who labour & the old who rest.

Is any sick? the Man of Ross relieves,
Prescribes, attends, the medicine makes & gives.

Is there a variance? enter but his door,
Balk'd are the courts & contest is no more.

Another you will find in the 24 chapter 11th
verse of Is. "When the ear heard me, then it
blessed me; and when the eye saw me, it gave
me to witness to me;

Because I delivered the poor that cried, and
the fatherless & him that had none to help him

The blessing of him that was ready to per-
ish came upon me: and I caused the wid-
ow's heart to sing for joy.

I put on righteousness & it clothed me;
my judgment was as a robe & a diadem

I was eyes to the blind & feet was I to the lame -

I was father to the poor: and the cause which I knew not I searched out.

And I brake the jaws of the wicked & plucked the spoil out of their teeth" -

The various ways in which it may be expressed, may be seen by going over the foregoing particulars under the head of justice. These duties we owe to all without distinction & the fact

of a persons being our enemy, by no means exonerates us from ^{the obligation of} doing him a

kindness. Special obligation is founded on the doctrine of special relations & is such as exists between parent and child, benefactor & beneficiary, a doctrine which I merely mention here and which I will hereafter enlarge upon, it. If we were as tenderly affected towards men in a remote place as we are towards those near us these special ties of kind feelings would be useless to others & injurious to ourselves - The same moral judgment which respects

Special
Obligation

recognises virtue at all shows the necessity of acknowledging these special obligations; besides the good of the whole is best represented promoted by giving exercise to the particular kind affections in their appropriate sphere. We give that name to a class of affections to distinguish them from a class that I shall hereafter mention. I would further remark that there is a strong tendency in our nature to create new channels & new objects for the particular affections. This on the other hand ought to be regarded against - hence it is that the artificial clans in religion & politics originate. The only exception to the tenor of these remarks is that there seems to be a provision in the sympathies of our nature for a peculiar interest towards the stranger; But when we consider this matter more closely, we find, that in reality it is no exception for in this case, the stranger falls into the class of the destitute, the helpless, the unprotected, who for this very reason has a particular rea-

son has a particular claim to our kind regards - This completes the view of this matter & I proceed to consider the same subject we have gone over in the light it is viewed by Civilians (Lawyers & Politicians I mean by these) who have disposed of the foregoing matters of duties under the correlative head of Rights. Correlative is a most convenient word & supposes the reciprocal relations - a wife supposes a husband - a child a parent &c. First we will define right. I know of no better than the Roman definition which is "Facultas aliquid agendi vel possidendi vel ab alio consequendi." which translated literally means, The faculty of doing anything - possessing anything or gaining anything from another & different divisions of Rights. They are divided first, into natural & acquired. I will only give a specimen of each, Self preservation is a natural right - that of preserving property an acquired right. Second They are divided into perfect & imperfect

Imperfect rights may be defined & for that reason may be enforced by law, & in a natural state where there is no law it may be maintained or recovered by force. An imperfect law cannot be so defined and consequently should not be enforced by law. Perfect rights are founded on justice. imperfect on benevolence; right of property is a perfect right; right to assistance in distress an imperfect right, &c. Let not the words perfect & imperfect mislead you as if the obligation on which perfect right is founded is stronger than imperfect; tis not so; for example the man in the parable had as perfect a right to assistance, as he had to the property of which he had been robbed, but the amount of assistance cannot be ascertained. If I have received great favours from another I'm bound to express my gratitude ~ Third. The alienable & inalienable. The words explain themselves: an alienable right may be parted with the other cannot.

Fourth into real & personal - that
here is not apposed to imaginary or
unreal but is used in its primitive sense
derived from the Latin word res a thing.

Real
&
Personal

Personal, are our rights to those affairs
which are considered, as it were appen-
dages to our persons. For instance would
take from a house he had sold his
furniture, books &c. In law it is
often difficult to keep the distinction
clear.

Fifth, External right, that
has no correlative. It is founded on
a fiction of the law introduced for the
sake of convenience. A man who
steals a horse has a relative right to
it until it is taken from him by a course
of law. Sixth, These are rights derived
from Government affecting in various ways
the persons & properties of others which are called
vested rights - those of corporations officers
& others. Our Institutions are jealous in regard
to such rights. In Europe they are very
numerous & of great importance. They have
laws there, preventing any persons from

External
Right

killing game but the Nobility—under penalty of a fine—when a trespass of this kind is committed it is called poaching.

LECTURE XVII

Equi-
nomics

Equonomics is that part of Ethics which relates to social relations and the obligation which arise out of them or belong to them. These relations are, first, that of the mind. This "of immense public utility" as it provides a school of virtue & good order for the young. It is also a very important topic both for the politician or statesman moralist. It was much practiced in the early part of the French revolution & has been attempted in our country but it never can succeed as it is contrary to nature. Robt tried it and partially succeeded. I will mention some of the particulars, the first law is monogamy & not polygamy; that the first is proved by the fact that the number of males & females are equal or nearly so. Some say the number of males is much greater and give as a reason for it the many ^{dent.} acci

to which man are liable under this
necessity. death from war &c
Yet in the East there are more females
than males. How is this to be accounted
for? There is no moral way of accounting
for it than to say it is a connivance
of the laws of nature; - nature accom-
modating herself in a certain degree
to the vices of society. Second, The
Contract of marriage should be for life
This is very obvious, because to make it
temporary would lead to jealousy, dis-
satisfaction and innumerable disor-
ders. + One strong reason for it is, that
its permanence makes the children secure
of the cooperation of both parents in making
provision for its education &c. Third
the essential condition of the contract
is fidelity & the duties belonging to it
are comprised under the head of conjugal
love affection - mutual love in the
highest sense. + The happiness of the
wife is the rule - the rule of the
husband and vice versa. + whether
the parties should be regarded as being

Contract
of
Marriage

on a perfect level is sometimes made a question - I should say that nature has evidently destined them for different offices and that each ought to govern in their respective spheres. As Civilization & Christianity advances the burden is taken from the female. ⁺ Upon the whole the woman fulfills her duties best by regarding the husband as the head, and he this, by treating her with the esteem and affection due to an equal uniting the tenderness and indulgence due to an inferior. Fourth, In point of authority, the superiority belongs to the man. Fifth, The relation subsisting is dissolved for adultery, desertion willful & obstinate & incapacity - & some add for hereditary disease obstinacy of temper &c. Marriage being a contract, an essential fraud dissolves it, when a woman thinks she has married a man & marries a brute. Sixth, Incestuous marriages are naturally & generally abhorred, why? I leave you to investigate. We will first say something

about the different degrees in which it
is prohibited. The first is that between
parent & child second, between brother
and sister and third cousins. The
two first degrees are called prohibited
the third lawful - My opinion is that
if the third is lawful it is not expedient
and I think this will be seen when we
come to inquire into the reasons of the pro-
hibitions. They are first, that the inti-
mate society of persons living together in
the two first degrees would present
frequent temptations to licentiousness,
to prevent which, the strong safeguard
provided in the strong sentiment of abhor-
rence which could not exist without the
prohibition. Secondly, it has been observed
that marriage within the nearer degrees
of relationship produces degeneracy in
the human species similar to what takes
place in inferior animals. The permis-
sion of such would prevent or invert
the natural relations, making those
to be superior who were inferior & that
produce confusion. The fourth

reason is that the observance of the rule tends to extend the multiplicity of social ties. - The next relation is that of parent and child, I would only remark that this relation is marked by instinctive affections - strongest in the parent; and, probably, in early life strongest in the female parent. Secondly, The duties of the parent are to provide for and educate the child. It is worthy of remark that nature lays the parent under obligations before the child could originate any, and moreover has given such powerful charms to infant innocence & helplessness, as to create an interest in every bosom. Education is far more important than the provision made for them and indeed, is not to be fully discharged except by the annuently wise and good. One of the most pitiable sights that can be presented to the reflecting mind is that of a human being becoming a parent before he or she has learned what responsibility means. Sanction of parental authority is briefly

the rod - the rod of correction in early life - at furthest expulsion from the family. * Duties of the child are obedience and a grateful return to the parent for the care and pains bestowed in the rearing and education of the child. As to the first, it has no other limits than those exposed by the paramount law of moral duty, i.e. a child is not bound to do what is morally wrong, because the parent commands it & I may add that there is no authority obligatory in the case. As to the second, the right of a grateful return is an imperfect right, but the obligation is not less than in a perfect right. --

Lecture XVIII.

We come now to the third relation of brothers & sisters. By joining persons together in these near relations Nature lays them under special obligations making all the duties of justice & mercy especially obligatory in a higher degree & to a greater extent than where persons not so related are concerned.

Relation
between
Brothers
& Sisters

There are many circumstances which should render children of the same parents & nothing is more detestable than collision and discord between them. The fourth relation is that subsisting between master and servant. It binds the servant to render services to his master for a limited time or at most for life. In return it is the duty of the master to provide for & protect his servant. to have a tender care for his interest & to treat him with humanity. The relation of master & apprentice comes under this head & is regulated by the same rule, and the apprentice is, generally, repaid by learning the trade of the master. In England, Ireland & Scotland, they are much more strict in regard to this matter than in this country, and no person is allowed to work at a trade without he has served an apprenticeship of seven years. It is owing to this that their workmen are so much superior to those of our country. The origin of slavery I will first draw the distinction between a slave & servant. The difference is, that the relation between a slave & his master is not founded on contract; whereas the

other is. The practice of taking prisoners in war is the origin of it and it is thus justified. By the laws of war, you have the power of life over your prisoners & if you spare it you have a right to sell him --- If we go to History, we will see that persons called slave traders followed the Roman army prepared with chains & hand-cuffs & that sometimes whole armies were sometimes made to submit & acknowledge their masters by walking under the yoke. Witherspoon says that this is possibly a justifiable, as it respects those taken in war, who have been the aggressors. Another, and the only cause where I think it justifiable is where personal liberty is forfeited by a crime committed & the argument for it is this: it is agreed that a man may (forfeit) to the laws of his country (his life), therefore he may forfeit his liberty. Slavery as it is - I will state first, the arguments of those who reprehend it altogether. I will state them briefly. They say "that the receiver of stolen goods is as bad as the thief." That those who took them first

"Committed an atrocious crime & that those who bought them were partners in the crime. The slaves were their property, but having no moral right to them they could transfer none; hence it follows that those now in possession are as bad as the original captors." I have many things to reply to this: my first remark is this; suppose a man were to tell me that a slaveholder of N.Y. who had received his slaves by hereditary descent was as bad & as much to blame as the man who kidnapped them in Africa? I should reply that it was going contrary to common sense. I conclude upon the whole as in the above mentioned case that it is no sin in this particular instance to hold them. It is however a great political evil - the institution itself is evil. The fifth

relation is that of friendship. Cicero says: "Solem emungo tollere videntur. quid amicitiam evita tollum." They seem to me to take away the sun from the world who take away friendship from human life. — First in selecting a friend be careful: as true friendship can only subsist between the virtuous. The sudden approaches

friend-
ship.

of such as wish to be friendly all at once
is usually to be suspected. — Secondly, In
discharging the offices of friendship there
ought to be a generous rivalry, not to be out-
done. Beyond reserve be unreserved
concealing nothing from your friend but
what it were better for him not to know.
I receive a secret from none but a
friend; when received keep it. Act the part
of a mentor & even censor to a friend
when he may be benefitted by it. This is a del-
icate but imperative duty. The offices of
friendship end not in death of the one but
extend to the fame and offspring of the other.
Friendship should be hereditary. "My friend
& thy father's friend forsake not." When
ought we to make common cause with a
friend? I would answer, in all cases where
we are not restrained by paramount obliga-
tion. Thirdly the termination of friendship
should be gentle. Sometimes it becomes
necessary for a person to dissolve the
alliance when he ascertains the person to be
not what he thought he was; but the
termination of friendship by no means

exonerates us from obligations imposed during its continuance. There are some very rare cases in which secrets may be deposited in another's year but they should be very rare.

Lecture IX.

Benefactor
&
Beneficiary

We now come to the seventh relation which is that subsisting between benefactor and beneficiary. If a benefit be bestowed in hope of a return, it is sold and not given & I think such an instance is seldom repaid with gratitude. I think a sense of gratitude stronger than justice. Henry, the Commentator, gives a few precepts which I think good. The first is to return good for evil, that to return good for evil is God-like, that to return evil for evil is brutal, & that to return evil for evil is devilish. Second a benefit always creates an obligation to be repaid in some way & at some time. It cannot always, nor even frequently be repaid in the same kind. The highest & richest of men may receive benefits from the most insignificant & at times when they most

most needs it. This is sufficiently illustrated
by the fable of the lion & the mouse -
The lion was asleep and a mouse having
run over him & disturbed his majesty's
 repose, he put his foot on him and would
have killed him instantly but for his prayers.
Sometime after the lion in roaming through
the wood was caught in a net and would
have been taken; but the mouse hearing
his cries came & liberated him by cutting
the net with his teeth. Third, gratitude Gratitude
is due. first to God; secondly, to parents
& I may add to faithful instructors &
then, to such others, as in the intercourse
of life may have either saved us from
danger, or put us in the way of advancing
our best interest. Much though, depends
upon the time & circumstances or exigencies
of the person benefitted. There is an old
& true saying which is "a friend in need
is a friend indeed." a small favour, if
well timed, is of much more importance
than a much greater would be when
not needed. For instance to a young
man, just setting out in life, the

best thing would be for him to learn as soon
 as possible to depend upon his own
 resources. & if a benefit conferred, induces
 him to lean upon any one for support, it
 is doing him an injury. Fourth, Ingratti-
 tude. This is one of the blackest of vices
 & as Cicero says: "Ingratum si dixeris omnia
 dixeris," which translated liberally means:
 Call a man ungrateful & you can say
 nothing worse of him. - Seventh, is the
 relation which exists between Covenan-
 ters i.e. of persons bound to each other
 by contract. Witherspoon's definition of
 a contract is a stipulation between two
 parties, before at liberty to make some
 alteration of property, or to bind one
 of the parties to the performance of
 some service. * Contracts are of three
 degrees in point of obligation first,
 there must be a simple declaration of
 an intention to do something in future
 secondly, a gratuitous promise; third
 a full contract which must be first,
 free, secondly, mutual, thirdly, lawful
 fourthly possible fifthly, with a capu-

Ingratitude

Relation
between
Covenan-
ters -

Contracts
 1st Simple
 declara-
 tion -
 2nd gratui-
 tous prom-
 ise -
 3rd a full
 contract

person & in the sixth place formal contracts are either are either beneficent or onerous, absolute or conditional. For special contracts see Pa-

cy. § We have now finished our duties to God - to our neighbour and to our-

Our duties
to
Ourselves

selves. § We now come to the third branch of Ethics comprehending our duties to

ourselves. They may be considered under the heads first of self government

Self
govt

* These imply prudence in restraining our passions, appetites desires &c, to the times, places measures & circumstances in which they are proper. -

Prudence in this aspect is a virtue of high importance, - her opposite is folly, & a^a vice which always attends unrestrained passion. - The second

Self
preservation.

head is self preservation, which of course forbids suicide & whatever & whatever would injure our health or destroy life. It requires us to repel violence to our persons, our liberties lives, or to escape from it in the best way we can from it. To repulse