

ac. Ps. Disputation 5th Jan 21st 1884,
pro Lee. on } Habit diff. from instinct in, this, that it is not
nat. but acquired. Habit is commonly defined, a facility
of doing a thing, acquired by having done it frequently.

This definition will do for habits of art; but there are many
habits, which may properly be termed principles of actions
that, in addition to facility give also a proneness, or impulse
to do the action. There are ^{some} (not a few) habits, that are
acquired by instinctive imitation. Such are strongest in
early life. E.g. Speaking, ^{Pronunciation} ^{melico} ~~voice~~ gesture, & all that comes un-
der the denomination manners. 3^{dly} Those habits are most
abiding & influential that are formed in youth. Every
one who has arrived at any thing like manhood can attest
the truth of this remark. Hence the importance of guard-
ing the young against the contracting habits that may prove
pernicious. 4^{thly} Where habits are not supported by prin-
ciples they are apt to wear out, in time; especially good
habits. Thus a person who has been trained to a virtuous
course of conduct, may in after life, partially cast off the
restraints of early education; but it often requires ~~no~~ longer
than one generation to obliterate them entirely.

5^{thly} The tendency to form habits seems to be an ultimate
fact, & mysterious to human comprehension.

Aristotle has classed virtues under habits. They differ
in their origin. The first act of ^a virtue is a virtue (this
cannot be said of habit). Yet when confirmed they have
the force of habit. (No virtue is to be trusted till
tried. The bravest braves when first taken into scenes of
danger may be overcome with terror.

The etymology of the term (from *ex h.* in Greek & *habere* in Lat.) may either signify that we possess the habit, or that the habit possesses us. It is not material in which sense we understand it; for both are true in point of fact.

Dr. Reid alleges that habit operates without will or intention. There seems not to be sufficient reason for this opinion, as is evident from what was shown when treating of the difficulty of attending to the operations of our mind: (of the will itself.)

Animal principles of action.

Those principles ^{in the constitution of man} called animal are such as operate on the will & intention, but do not suppose any exercise of judgment or reason; & are most of them found in some brute animals as well as in man.

In this class the first to be noticed are called appetites; which consist, 1st of an uneasy sensation: 2nd a desire of their obj. The sensation is produced by some state of the body. They are not constant but occasional & periodical. There are three principal kinds of appetite viz hunger, thirst & lust. These are com. to man with most other animals; & their ends are obvious. The app. of hunger e.g. admonishes when we need nourishment — its ingredients it consists of an uneasy sensation & a desire to eat, which increase & subside together. These app.s. are neither selfish nor benevolent. Though the 2nd first are solitary & the 3rd social. This last may

The desire of kn. discovers itself in one person by an avidity to know the gossip of the village; in another, the economy of the next family; in another, to know what the post brings; & in another to trace the path of a comet. 2nd Desire of Esteem is doubtless the strongest in human nature. It differs in dif. states of improvement; but every person desires to be praised for something or other, & no one can easily bear to be held in contempt. There are not a few instances of cowards dying to avoid the reproach of cowardice. Desire of esteem may lead some to low & base conduct; but most com^{mon} ^{have a tendency to} prompt to ingenious, manly & virtuous deeds; for every one must know that the virtuous only are truly esteemed. 3rd desire Every person desires, more or less, to be esteemed even after his body has been deposited in the tomb & his spirit has gone beyond the reach of the praise or censure of his fellow men. Some have denied this to be the case with respect to themselves but their practice has contradicted their profession (E.g. Epicurus & one whose Epitaph Pope has written, who refused to be placed in W. m. ch.,) 4th A desire of Power (ambition). Among barbarous tribes, as well as among many kinds of gregarious animals rank is determined by strength, courage, swiftness, or such other qualities. Among civilised nations many things of a dif. kind give rank & power. E.g.

Places in gov. titles & honor, riches, wisdom, eloquence
virtue & even the reputation of these. All these
are either dir. sp.^s of power or means of acquiring
it; & when sought for that end must be consider-
ed as instances of the desire of power. In this as in
others let a medium be preserved.

4th A D. of Society. Man is by nature a social being.
Exclusion from Society is little preferable to death itself, ^{medium}

5th Emulation or desire of superiority in Am. office, con-
test, courtship &c. This is not malevolent but is apt to
degenerate into vice. A desire of excelling in any thing
excellent cannot be wrong; But when competition is
carried on with dissingenuousness & unfairness & envy
it is certainly detestable.

6th A D. of Money; called artificial because the
desire is transferred from the end to the ~~the~~ accom-
to money as the means.

Desires, in themselves considered are neither virtuous
nor vicious; neither selfish nor benevolent. Yet
estimable & belong to what the Greeks called the
to kados of virtue
D. of Good
Benevolent affections.

Concivium, Signifies, not ~~regulating~~ & drinking but social in
course. Particular benevolent affections - 1st of parents
for children 2nd of children towards parents - the former
is the stronger of the two. 3rd That of kindred in a collateral
line. 4th Gratitude towards benefactors. Ingratitude is one
of the worst traits in character. It is not the service, but
the principles from which an action is performed that
call for gratitude. Those things that most deserve grati-
tude are such as seldom meet with it. e.g. When a
person performs a good office against our will. ~~don't thank~~
5th Pity, or compassion for the distressed. 6th Esteem
of the wise & good - found in all men. ^{1st} Good & bad.

7th Friendship. (Cicero de Amicitia.) This to be gen-
uine must be uninterested. Youth most susceptible of
this affection. It seems necessary to Friendship that
there be something like equality; & also similarity
in temper, disposition habits, ~~and~~ way of thinking &c.

The enemies of the Gospel make it an objection that
it does not inculcate friendship: But this principle
is sup. strong & the human constitution without being
enforced by the gospel. This will hold of other
similar objections. There is Reason for

friendship in the nature of things. 1st Human na-
ture is very weak we cannot see ourselves as others
us. 2nd we often need good advice, which a faithful
many may give. But we should consider that it

Passion. Any of the desires or affections may be called by this name of passion, when it becomes excessive. This will be seen by going over them particularly e.g. ¹⁰ desire of esteem, of power, of Society. Thus of affections one companion may be passionately fond of the other. parents of children &c. (vide Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments) No passion or affec. ought to be indulged in company, in which the company cannot participate. (Same in public speaking)

Universal benevolence is even a passion in some e.g. Howard In respect to all; *Regē animā*. On the contrary there may be too little pass. in our Desires & affs. It is worthy of remark that 1st that passs usually produce visible effects on the body.

2nd Passs of all kinds have a strong influence in biasing the judgment 3rd It tends strongly to fix the atten. on the obj. & has a sort of magic influence on the imagination. Lastly all the Passs are contagious. History & abs. furnish facts. Peter the hermit

Hope, fear, joy & sorrow have been usually ranked among the Passs They are rather states of the mind arising from good or evil.

When attended with excitement called passion. Aristotle's remarks on the passs very judicious. Stoical doctrine respecting passs not correct. The following something like passions. 1st His position to be moved by some animal principles rather than by others equally common with animal & rational principles. E.g. is an affinity between

2 passs. 1st good & bad humor. Others are influenced not only by moral but also by physical causes. e.g. the state of the atmosphere. State of the stomach &c. (There are many little things to be attended to in order to good humor.) 2nd Elevation & Depression. Good moral principles have great influence in producing elevation of mind. (Bodily exercise in the open air, indispensably necessary to good spirits) Disposition influences belief & vice versa.

Corollary. Bad as the systems of religion may be, the worst of them the worst of them is far better than sheer infidelity. (vide Robert Hall's discourse on The French Revolution.)

Cases in which our conceptions are attended with a momentary belief of the existence of their obj; are 1st When conception is exercised & perception is not e.g. in sleep - in the darkness of night 2nd at long & morbid attention to the same objects. (in Madmen & hypochondriacal) (Lord Herbert's vision) 3rd When the perception is faint so that it is not easily distinguished from conception (as in dim twilight)

Our conceptions of visible obj's are usually more vivid & lively than those of (the obj's of the senses hearing, tasting, smelling touch) - sound, taste, smell & touch.

3 Attention is that act of the mind by which it carefully notices the objects of perception & consciousness.

When employed about the former (percepⁿ) it is termed Observation, when about the latter reflection. Storing facts in the mind is not kn. kn. consists in the mind observing the relations of things. There are 2 causes, why things are not attended to: 1st The mind is wholly occupied by other obj's 2nd The rapidity with which they pass - (absence of mind & attention not always in exercise) Rapidity, reading, arith. calculation, obj's distant - Equilibrium, Hagen. result of habit. Query: Are acts performed by habit independent of the will? (not entirely) We exert direct acts of attention more easily than reflex ones. There is a great analogy between space & time. There are two things in atten worthy of notice An effort to exclude & 2nd to retain - selecting processes of thought. The faculty of atten is very improvable.

(Read on nervous affections, is said to be a valuable work)

(Dissertation 2th) Abstraction may be distinguished from conception, chiefly, in the two following particulars
1st By the power of abstraction we are able to attend to any one individual quality of a substance, exclusively of others; though such quality does not exist separately.

But we cannot conceive a quality aside from other qualities of the same subs^{particular}.
E.g. we can make a colour an object of attention without thinking of other qualities in the obj. coloured, ^{as} hardness softness, sweetness, bitterness, roughness, smoothness &c. If such were not the case, it would not be possible for us to distinguish co-existent qualities from one another: But when we conceive of a particular colour, ^{as} red black, blue or yellow, we must have in our imagination some particular object, of which the colour in question is a secondary quality. The classification of different obj's ^{Says Prof. St. H.} supposes a power of attending to some of their qualities or attributes without attending to the rest; for no two obj's are to be found without some specific difference; & it is not possible to sort & class things not perfectly alike, without leaving out of view their distinguishing peculiarities & confining the attention to those attributes which belong to them in common.

2^{ndly} ^{means of} By the power of abstraction we can judge of the resemblance which one obj. bears to another in a given particular. E.g. We can limit our attention to whiteness, so as to perceive a resemblance (abstractly considered) among several obj's which come under the denomination white. E.g. flower, chalk, lime, snow &c.

There are two kinds of abstraction: 1st of the understanding; 2nd of the imagination. Berkley, Hume & Reid have not made this distinction. Stewart has, incidentally noticed a difference between abstractions subservient to reasoning & those subservient to imagination. By abstraction of the imagination is meant that power which the mind has of de-compounding, separating, & modifying & thus producing new combinations of those perceptions it has by means of objects of Sense. This is no more or less than a good poet or painter does in presenting to our fancy an extraordinary & grand scene, or a good painter in portraying a ^{variegated} & beautiful landscape. They must collect their materials from obj's of sense in the nat. world, or from ^{the experience of} actual facts & occurrences in the moral world. To create new materials, is not within the limits of finite power. But so great is the power of imagination in combining & modifying things which actually exist, that the original word *Poetns* ~~sign~~ to denote a poet literally rendered signifies a maker.

We can conceive of a quality of an obj. abstracted & perceived by one sense, abstracted from a quality perceivable by a different sense; but not ^{from} a quality perceivable by the same sense. E.g. We can conceive of the form or colour of a rose abstracted from the smell; but we cannot conceive of the colour of a rose abstracted from its shape & figure. There are no abstract conceptions of the imagination in a genl. sense. [] We can conceive of the parts of an obj. separate from other parts. E.g. I have no diff in conceiving of a man mutilated as to a hand or foot,

By abstraction of the understanding is meant the power of fixing the attention ^{on} one thing exclusively (The word thing is here taken in its most extensive signification) Illus. We can fix our attention ~~on~~ ^{in the body fig. and} figures & extension abstract from other qualities. We can think of a mathematical line without referring it to real existence. 2nd We can fix our atten. on a quality abstract from its subj. though we cannot conceive of a quality abstract from its subject. Hence the terms abstract & concrete. It is an abstract noun or a noun expressing a quality ^{abstractly} as whiteness, hardness &c. the 2nd an adj. expressing a quality in a subj.

Virtue is a quality belonging to human conduct; not discerned by any of the senses, yet it may be defined without applying it to any one action. Goodness is an other abstract quality of which we can have a notion without connecting it in our mind with any particular obj. we may denominate good. We predicate goodness of whatever answers any useful or desirable end. Entity & quiddity embrace all obj's of abstraction.

→ There are two classes of gen. terms 1st in-cludes gen. attributes; the other ^{incompos} classes of things—genera & species. As to the first, it is evident from their nature ~~of~~ ^{or} that attributes (to use the Latin term) ^{predicables} must be expressed by gen. terms; for whatever is ^{predic} affirmed or denied of one subj. may be aff. or denied of more. As to the 2nd The agreement observable in certain attributes of many individuals, would suggest the propriety of referring them all to one class & giving a name to the class. Which name comprehends all the attributes which ^{distinguish} the class (vide Ricci)

A gen. term, in its application, does not ^{exclude} ~~ally~~ properties
of the genus or sp. which it denotes; though it does not
designate them. In the gen. term there are qualities
embraced, common to every individual, & others belong-
ing to individuals specially. Illus. The gen. term triangle
denotes simply the space included by 3 straight lines,
The sides may be of any conceivable proportion; & so
that the sum of any two is greater than the third
Still it is a triangle. The generic term does not
exclude specific qualities; nor does it designate them.

So we can have a notion of a triangle without
perceiving or conceiving an individual (vide Locke)
The word man is a generic term. When we speak of
man in the abstract, our notion of him is limited to
those attributes which are possessed in com. by every
individual of the human species: yet we know at
the same time that no two individuals are perfectly alike.

 Abstraction, is that faculty by which we analyse the actual assemblages of nature into their constituent parts.

Every obj. of thought is one single obj. Individuals are innumerable—hence the impossibility of expressing all these obj. by separate terms. This difficulty is obviated by the power of generalisation & abstraction—or by the use of gen. terms. All words are gen. except proper names. Gen. words make propositions gen. in this all phils. agree. Though they differ in the mental process. To the question "What is the obj. of our attention when we employ a gen. term?" 3 dif. answers have been given. 1st that it is the idea of the sp. or genus, denoted by the gen. term. & that this Idea existed from eternity & was that according to which the Reality formed every individual of the sp. or genus. & further that it exists in every individual without multiplication, or division, making the essence of the g. or sp. or that every g. & sp. possessed it in com. with every thing else—unchangeable.

2nd that it is the attributes belonging to that class of individuals to which the term is assigned. or the meaning of the gen. term. 3rd That it is nothing else than the gen. term itself. The first of these answers contains the opinions of the Pythagoreans, & Platonists & their followers among the Schoolmen, called Realists.

The 2nd that of the Conceptualists (Locke & Reid most distinguished.) The 3rd That of the Nominalists Hobbes, Berkeley, Hume, Campbell & Stewart.

Rosselinus & his pupil Abelard first propagated the doctrine of the Nominalists among the moderns.